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INTRODUCTION 
This paper begins vlith a s tudy of the philosophical thought 
preceding Platon is m and Aristo!lianilsm, in order that ,�"" might 
have a �clearer understanding of the issues with ,,11icll the se two 
men dealt. It is es sen tial for us to understand Platonism and 
Aristotlianism for tHO reasons: first, it is Hithin th" fr ameHork 
of t:re thought of these uvo men that s ucceedin g philosophy as 
largely vor ked ; sec ondly, if one understands t�e issues ",ith ,,,1de;, 
these. rnen struggle.d, he Hill understand the issues uitb. lvhich 
w..odern philosophy denls.. There fore, some space in t1':e. paper has 
been f'llotted to the t i'ought of these men. 
The p2fJer then moves q uickly through rondiev£ll thought a'1d 
nominaliSi:l to Galileoo Froin Galile o t �: thou(;�:t tile paper moves 
to Descnrtes, British empiricisillr and the.n to Kant. Tj·e Emphasis 
is gi'\-oen here. to tl�e ccuflict beti>;een the epistemology df science 
and t:,e ontology \'Jhich .Galile o , Descar te s , and l:i8 s ucce ssors 
accepted. Ti:eir phi.losophy is se.en a::; an Httempt to pro'vide a 
basis for s�iencets epistemology in a v:orld '{<'hieh lras ril.. ien -;-0 ita 
T>e paper t;en noves i-o its ronclusion--t;-e. e.xplication of. 
th:; e�istcmology of sc ie nce [mel t c ontology \.;rhic' it • 
is t>e close :t'Gla;-ions beD--Jee.n epistenology nne cntolo[y .. 
By ontology I t�an a the.ory of f'e nature of refl1ity--t11ose t1 ings 
';ahich "hlB perceive. in sense pe.rception and 811 rel-'lte.d to 
1. �an the of hOl] VJe lcn.oP' reality.; 
Presocratic Development 
Western philosophy is said to have begun with the Melisians on 
the coast of Asia Minor. Ionian thought centered upon the search 
for an underlying, material principle which would unite the diversity 
of experience. Out of this search arose the western epistemological 
problem; for Anaximenes, in his answer to the problem of change 
of the one to many, commenced the issue of epistemology. The 
diversity of experience, so he declared, is based on e quantitative 
change of the one; therefore, a quantitative change of that which 
is causes a quantitative change in us. Experience is denied in 
order to solve the problem of change; we know in experience not 
,,,hat is (the one principle, undifferentiated), but the diversity 
of various things. To so lve his ontological problem of change, 
Anaximenes, then, presented an epist€'l!lological answer. In 
preceding pre-socratic philosophy, this epist�mological approach 
to the ontological problem of the one principle became even more 
important. 
i!leraclitus and Pdrmenides, follm.,ing Anaximenes, attempted 
to establish again an underlying principle beneath experience. 
Both as An aximenes approached the problem in terms of epistemology. 
Heraclitus asserted that all things flow, that there is only change, 
and that the one is the process of change; hence, l-e denies our 
experience of permanence. Parmenides on the other hand, asserted 
tbat nothing changes, that change is an illusion, and that the one 
is this undivided, unchanging whole that never becomes; hence, he 
denies our experience of 't,mpermanenc�. 
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Here. perhaps it l>IQuld be good to analyze more closely some of 
the underlying assumptions in pre-socratic p"ilosophy. Al tl10ugh 
the ',ork of 1'hese philosophies is obsure and incomplete and their 
philosophies largely tmdeveloped, cettain trends do stand out 
clearly. First, t:"leir acceptance of a concept (the principle. of an 
underlying material unity) demonstr'ltes their assumption that 
conception or reason can 1."110'1:'; v;That is, rather than can preception. 
For sense-experience is denied or confirmed as it agrees with their 
conception of the one material principle. Not only is conception 
set above preception, but concep ion is though,t to be able to 
grasp ,,,hat is, to knot] reality itself. This point for us to 
unders tand is difficult because of our emphasis on sense experience; 
but it is esoentiitl for us to understand to is approach if He are 
to unders t2nd Greek philosophy. 
Following the lead of 1-"e earlier p}lilosopl�ers mentioned above 
the pluralists, Empedocles and Anaragoras, sought for an understanding 
of the Horld. Hov-lever, they rejected this conception of a material 
unity; rather, they posited the infinite nmnber of different 
particulari ties. Al though V'le.v modified i 11eir conception in terms 
of the diversity of experience, they did So chiefly because of 
logical reasons concern ing change, no t from a des ire to be true to 
sense experience. Picking up this tra in of t'lought was t11e first 
school--;of philosopL,y wtich actually dealt l,'lith he 1?roblem of 
ttv1hat and how'tVe knm.j'u __ the Atomists. However, intervening betueen 
tl�e pluralists and tlle Atomists is an extrememly important movement 
in philosophy--t"e Sophists. 
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Orginally, this school ,:,,�as composed of lez,lrned men vILo dispersed 
their kno,dedge to studen s. Then the teachers gradually developed 
a sophistication of thOUg11t that ripped apart the old Greek 
poly-theism, scoffed at many of the soci:H and ethical mores of the 
time, and repudiated previous philosophy as an illustration of the 
inability of man to know. Bthics, values, knouledge--these Here 
all decried by the Sophists. Demonstrative of this movement is 
Gorgias' three Dronged scepticism found in tie Sextus. First, 
nothing exis s: "if Be ing is everlasting, it is boundless1 if 
boundless, it has no position (is no"here); if w itllout position, 
it does not exist." "Similarly, Being cannot be created, if it 
were, it must come from something, either Being (Hhich would have 
to be created) or Non-being, '''hich is impossible." Secondly if 
anything exists, it is uncomprehensib1e: "if the concepts of the 
mind are not realities, reality cannot be i.hought • •  " 
"Therefore reality is no' tlle obJiect of thought, and cannot be 
comprehended by it." Finally. the last point in Gorgias' 
scepticism is that if anything is comprehensible, it is 
uncommunicab1e: "He communicat-e not i"llinf(s which exist, but only 
speech:; just as that Hhich is seen cannot become that which is 
heard, so our speech cannoT be equated vtith that 'whicl� exists, 
since it is outside of us. tt 
It "VJ2S against t�;e scepticism that Democritus a,l1d :1is sebool 
of atominism took over the posil ion of I:"e pluralists and developed 
it against VIe sophists! sceptici�m. Reality is composed of an 
infinite number of Permenidean F,'oles--inclivisible, undifferentiated, 
uncre2tec1, indestructable; thus, atonism is a materialism ;;']t'ose 
epistomology is mec 'anis :�ic. Pre.ception and conception is an 
of atoms, upon t1:e atoms t1":;;t compose our senses and mind 
S\Veet exists by convention, color exisls by 
convention; atoms and void (alone) exist in 
reali ty .. .. ..  iVl; know nothing accurately in 
reality, but(only) as it changes according to 
the bodily conditions, and tl-,e constitutuion of 
those t-hings '!a flo" upon (the body) and 
impinge upon it. 
Therefore, pe in conception and preception do not lenolV reality 
(the atoms and t>le void in '(�!!>ich they move); rather, h"e l::not'-f the 
-, 
0° effects of atoms impinging upon to'e atoms of�senses and of our 
mind, creating images of the source from 't<y'"'ere the atoms came.. 
The image I have of this pipe I am smoking is caused by atoms 
leaving t'le pipe, s triking ·tl�e a oms of my eye and causing a 
chain reaction bacl.::. to my brain uhere the image of the pipe is 
produced. Alt:1ough t'-<is position 'iq:lS tllC source of t�H:� modern 
atomism of Galileo and Descartes and of modern empiricism, let 
us not ':�ink ':',lHlt Democritus ;'ad left Greek. rationalism: 
"there. are two 'sorts of knowledge, one genuine, one bastard (or 
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obscure). To the la er belongs all the following: sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, l"ouch. The real is separa ad from this. H Thus, 
sense-prece.ption in Democritus' thougbt is Dlaced beloy1 tl';e genuine 
kno'Hledge--conception. HOVlever as Aristotle noted in de sensu 
tfDemocri tus and '(!,H� majori y of natural philosop ers \'F10 discuss 
preception are guilty of a grent absurdity, for they represent 
all precaption by ouch. tI \'lhen atomism 'pas revised by Galileo 
and Descaries, because of '-e gre.ater emp11ssis on sense-
experience from science, 'l ',is represent2tion of preception in 
terms of tone1' is of e.x-; rama importance. 
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Democritus and t1'e atomists meet, t; e sophist attack by af'�ree.ing 
vlitt them: we know only our Ovm ne ntal states and not reality. 
HO'h'ever, our men tal images are. caused mecl-,anis tically and H:us are. 
some�vl-tat re.preseni"ative of renlity. Here, the1tl�f is represented 
one extreme of Greek philosophy--pluralistic atomism. Let us nO'; 
turn to the other trend of development--Socra tic -Platonism. 
Platonism 
To unders and his second conclusion of Greel, philosophy 
reac"ed in Platonism, one must first look a Socrates. Although 
Socratic tl10ug L cannot be sifted our of its platonic colJi�xt, 
certain charac teristics of Socrai ic thoug" t can be ascertained 
throug', a s udy of Socra e.s l' speec'1es in the Apology and t1)e 
Socratic technique iv<>ich runs throughout t'1e dialogues. 
First, Socrates definitely asserted the. possibility pf knOHledge, 
although in searching for knoVlledge, he destroyed much of the 
presumed knovJledge of his associa�es. Despite this sophistic 
analysis of knoHledge, throughout the dialogues is displayed a 
Socra tes searching for knoHledge. The ten books of the Republic 
are a quest for a definiti@n of justice. Although the substance 
of the· Republic is probably Platonic, the ques t for kno"ledge is 
Socratic indeed. Thus, the Socra ic technique is one of continual 
discussion, in '>1\1 ich one. searches for Imotvledge.. Since Socrates 
sought knoHledge, he must :(ave be.lieved its existence. 
Secondly,. Socrates /01180 aff irme.d tl:e axis tence of values, 
again in opposition to the Sophists of his day such as 
Thrasymaclios. In Book I of liLe Republic, Thrasyn'.achos declares, 
Ujustice. is no-thing but the. advantage of the: stronger." The rest 
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of Book I consis ts in an examining En ,�l a refuting of t,,�e. assertion 
by Socrates in a rather heated discussion ;;'Jitl; his £e110\v sophist, 
ThrasymBchos. Even clearer in the Apology is Socra ces' belief 
in t'le reality of values; for Socrates took deatl1 on his conviction 
of tl1e moral nature of the universe. 
No, gentleman, t Ie difficult thing is not 0 escape 
dea'd" I th ink, but to escape 'Hickedness • • • •  
I fortell, gentlemen, my slayers, tha a punish­
ment '''ill come upon you straight after my 
death, much harder I declare, than execution 
at your hands is to me; for now you have done 
this, t11inking to shake yourselves free from 
giving account of your life, but it Hill turn 
out for you some:', ing very differen t, as I fore­
tell • • • •  this one t1,ling you must take as 
true--no evil can ,:appen to a good man either 
living or dead. 
Tbus spake Socrates to '?1e. jury at his trial after receiving a 
, 
sen tence of death. Thus, it is obvious that Socrates affirmed the 
existence of values and of knm"ledge. Upon this exis tential 
affirmation, Plato built is p'lilosophy. 
Plato's epistomology centers around tile t',eory of forms, 
"'hic!: ',e uses to demons trate ,hOH values and lmoHledge Hhic 11 
Socrates affirmed are posl'ible. In brief ois ;,eory is t",is: 
for each category of t:hing� '::'-1a exist is an arci1type, an idea, 
T;]hich is non-spatial or temporal, but ;las an ob jective existence 
of its Oim. Hhen t11e h.uman mind knows, it knoV7s the idea and t:1US 
can recognize all particulars that exist. Furt}ler, each particular 
is made from its idea; it gains its reality from tlle absolute 
reality of ',e idea. Hence, Plato feels he ',as demonstrated the 
possibility of knmdedge by 'hese lVO as ertions: knoHing a never-
changing idea ensures tile universality and validity of knoHledge; 
He realness of t'1e particula r "'1ich is t",e object of knoHledge 
is c.nsure.d by ,8 absolu·'·e renli;y of <ie idea from vi�ic:' it hlHS 
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made. To estnblis" an epistemology, implicit in Socratic thought, 
Plato had t.o e.s'iablish the certainity of 'YJhat is knovm and the 
possibili ty of knoHing it. In" is t',eory of forms he does both. 
Plato here apparently vias aware of t�le necessary connection 
be tueen ontology and epis teJ101ogy--a connee t ion vJ11 ich existed 
from tl'\e first in the earlies t VIes tern p'lilosopIi.Y. Plato rig!, tly 
felt "e need to establish Hi't his epis1emology a companion 
ontology. This insight--that ontology o,nd epistemology are 
inseparatable and inter-dependent--has been largely lost by modern 
philosophy. One need only look at logical positivism's principle 
of verifibility to see t'lal in every episte,mology is an implicit 
ontology. Ii, is not coincidence that episH3moiogy nnd oni'ology 
arose together in '!;vestern' 'thought. 
Hith this b rief introduction, let us examine t')e tl;E!ory of 
forms in greater detail. Plato offers evidence of be existence 
of the ideas in ",e Phaedo and tile Timaeus. In tl,e Phaedo, Socrates 
points our t,,,,,t people Lalk of equality. THo sticks are equal in 
v:rid �(1 and length; peo'ple say i hat �\e.y are, therefore, equal. Fe.w 
people ",ould dispute he validity of he concept of equality; but 
what is it? Socrates points out t',a-; equality is not the same as 
the s t ieks, but can be conceived in t1e abstract. Al thoug» 
equality i s  not t1\e. same as ,t1-le sticks or any 0 :ler particualrities, 
"you have, nevertheless, conceived and acquired kno\dedge of 
equality ,. ,. then vIe mus t have kno't<;rledge of equality before. t�le 
ings. n Were did t.h is h"UOV1]e dge of 
equality come from, since it could have come from experience Ilith 
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any particulnr? Socrn tes ind ica' e.d Ya - lmo'\deqge of equality could 
only have come from t"te universal form of equality. Only by first 
knmving the idea of equnli t'y, could ';,:e tl�en recognize tile t:}O sticks 
as be in" equal. 
In the Timaeus, Plato's approach is that true kno\'!ledge cannot 
be relative, bui lll'ist be absolute. If our knotJledge is only of 
particulars \'J:�ich are al'>"ays c�'ianging and becoming, our ImoVlledge 
VJould be alvlays Clanging, Lence, relative. Only is our knol>71edge 
is based upon an absolute ,.,ie], does not change, can our knoHledge 
be true. Plato offers t'", ideas--beyond time and space--as such 
absolutes, 
Al though t:his evidence or tlle idea? is not perhaps conclusive, 
Plato's verifica t ion of kno,·ledp;e does not rest finally upon Ute 
ideas. His final absolute �'Jhic)l makes knoHledge valid and certain 
is t"e principle of t'"" Good, In t"e la"t analysis, the possibility 
of knotvledge and he reality, and therefore t'1e certainty, of 
the objec': of knov:1edge (the nar'�'iculars) rests upon this intuitive 
flash-_the Good. To understend t 'e principle of t",e Good, let us 
turn to Plato's myth ·of l'H?" cave fotmd in Book VII of the Republic: 
Imagine mankind as d0�11ing in an under­
ground cave Hith a long entrance open to the 
light across the whole ."idth of tile cave; in 
this tt·ey have been from childhood, with necks 
and legs fettered, so bey have to stay where 
they are, They cannot move their heads round 
because of ; he fe tters, and they can only look 
forward, but light comes to them from a fire 
burning behind them hig'ler up at a distance. 
Be b:-:e.en the fire and the prisoners is a road 
above their level, and along it imagine a 
low .,rall bas been buil t, as puppet shov1lllan have 
screens in front of j heir people over "'hi�h 
they vlOrk their puppets. 
II see, t he said. 
'See, l:hen, bearers carrying along this 
wall all sorts o f  articles Hl1ich they hold 
projecting above -;:.i:e '>!all, s: atues of men and 
ot:-:er living ti:ings, El.ude of s one or Hood and 
all kinds of stuff, some of )e, bearers speal;;ing 
and some sile.n t, 8.:0 you mig> t expect. t 
'Y-Jhat a remarkable image, t he said, 'and 
'Y-t'at reularkable prisoner3! t 
'Just like ourselves,' I, said. 'For. first 
of all, tell me T"�S: Hhat do you '(;,ink such 
people "?ould have seen of l":emselves and each 
ot·�er except -1 heir shadolls, 'Vlhich the fire past 
on the opposite 1:1211 of t:le cave?' 
'I don't see hO"7 they could see anything 
else,' said 'ie, 'if they ';'ere compelled to keep 
tl'eir heads tmmoving all their lives!' 
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'Very v7el1, 'hThat of the things being carried along> 
,:iould not this be the same?' 
'Of course it "ould. • 
·Suppose the prisoners Here able to talk 
together, don't you tiiink bat wilen ; 'ley named 
the shadoHs H::icle '::ey say pascing t'ley "'ould 
believe t':ey Here naming things?' 
'Neces 'arily. • 
'Tr'en if ':eir prison i\ad an aC:tQ frou t>e 
opposi-:e. Hall, It', eneve.r Dne of t>�,e passing 
bearers uttered a sound, "'ould t>,ey not suppose 
tbat the passing shadoH mus t be making tile 
sound? Dou't you think so?' 
'Indeed I do,' said Glaucon. 
"If so, f said I, 'such persons i'7DUld certainly 
believe that t:l.ere ';;'Jere nO' realities except 
those. sl':adovls Df j'andmade things.· 
'So it must be,' be siad. 
'NO�<l cDnsider t' said I, ''\'11' at t 'eir 
release vJOuld be like and V'eir cure from Lese 
fe ters and tj�eir folly; let us imagine t>711et,'er 
it migi't naturally be sDmething like this. One 
might be released, and compelled sudc1enly to 
stand up and turn around, and to "ork and look 
tOHards the firelig"t; all this \Vould hurt 
him, and "e >!ould be too much dazzled to see 
distinctly 'close " ings viose s>adoHs he had 
seen before. ,\tJ1;at dO' you think >e vJDuld 
say, if someone i:_Dld �\im tha 'ti,'at l:e satV' 
before 'tilas foolery, but. nOH 1;e saw rigL tly, 
be ing a bi t nearer real i ty and turned to'liJard 
things ,hain;:: a bit more real? . . .. Suppose 
no". ' said I, 'that someone should drag "im 
thencl. by force, up La rough ascent, tLe. steep 
"ay up, and never stop until ",e could drag 
him out into the light of the 81m, would he 
not be distressed and furious at being 
dragged; and wt,en "e came into the ligl,t, the 
bri11ance would fill his eyes and he V70uld not 
be able to see even one of the things no'" 
called real.' 
'That h� \\;ould not, f said "ie, tall of a 
sudden.' 
tHe "\Y'ould ;;3ve '1'.0 become used t.o it, surely, 
I tl�:ink, if he is to see t1,e tl'-ings above." 
First, he would most easily look at sbado,;vs, 
after i-hat im.a�e8 of mankind and the rest in 
"Flater, lastly the things themselves . .. . .  
Last of all, I suppose, tte sun; be could look 
on 'e'le 81m itself il:t its own place, and see 
"'hat i t  is like, nat reflections of it in 
vlater or as it appears in some alien setting. t 
'Nece ssar i ly ,t said he. 
'Only after 'his '1\e might reason about 
it, hOH this is '"e 'Y]:"_O provides reasons and 
years, and is set: over all the.re is in the 
visible region, and he is in a manner the cause 
of all things \,1 �ich t},ey sa�',. t 
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Plate goes on to say that· the sensual "lOrId of becoming and 
relativity is the prison of t',e cave. The fireligllt casting 
the shado'u liJ.icI'. He see is the stm. The ascent is the struggle 
to free ourselves from t:iis prison in order t:�at \<7e r ise into the 
upper world--tl1e "orld of 'he mind. T'le object in the upper 
v70rld are t1:e ideas; finally, t:le 8tm, last to  be seen, is the Good. 
I-lence, the highest reality is le Good. The climax of knoVlledge 
is the Good. 
Before ,-:e e}::amine the relations1:ip bet'Heen tIle ideas, kno'Hledge, 
and tl-e Good, let us consider how this principle of t'le Good is 
known. Plato in Book VII of the Republic states that "the Good 
is not itself a state of knotl1edge, but sometiling '(:ranscending 
far beyond in digtlity, and povrer .. " Hence, 1;JIJ.ile reason can grasp 
the. ideas, t]:e. Good, being beyond the ideas is beyond ttdialecticaltt 
reason, it is knovID by, an intuitive vision.. Tl:erefore \'l:;ile tLe 
ftExe.rcise of Re.ason" can know the ideas, it cannot reach tbe 
ideas. R ather, PIa to speaks in Book VII of "an instrument in 
11 
of being and t'e most brillant 1 t of Ming.tf This instrument 
is, I believe, intuition. 
"\\lit!, tJ..:is understanding of he. Goed, le.i us return to Plato's 
statements concerninIT" knoFlec,[:;e and the, Good. Ha indicates in 
Book VI of the Republic thgt tbe Good is . he cause of the ideas 
being kno,m as "ell as the cause "of the sta e of Imo"ledge." As 
the sun illumina1es a pardcular object and permits it to be knovm, 
So the Good illumines the ideas, perll'itting them to be kno .. m. 
Thus, tl;e Good creates the possibility of knoV1ledge, by someho'" 
enabling tl1e Reason to kno�', t1te.m. This then is the Good--tl:e 
source and caUse of ImNl1edge, the absolute standard of truth, 
the ontological founda ion of all else. Let us move on no'" to 
the ideas or forms to exam'.ne their relationship to Imo,vledge, and 
"OV1 t',ey are knOV1U. First, Ie t us examine ",hat Plato "as to say 
in Book VI. 
And He speak of beauty by itself and good 
by itself and So on for eac;l of all t;Otose 
tl'ings i<'hicll He 'lave just put as many; again, 
moreover, ",7e say that t').ese. are rela -j ed to one 
single perfect ideal for each, and He put each 
as a portion 9£ a single essence, and each is 
really Hhat '\;re name.. 
For each class of things "hat exist, a lID.iversal form exists. 
Each particular oak tree partakes of the oakness. Oakness not 
only gives reality to each particular oak tree, but actually exists 
independen tly of all oak trees. So for all th in�8 tha l can be 
Imo't>Jl1 tbare is a form, an idea--some th.ing mind--lilce ;;'111 ich is 
ontologically beyond the mind.. Thus, as t:\e Good offers an 
on tological footing to ;°i.e ideas, so t:le ideas provide reality 
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to the Horlel of sense-experience. Eac.l\ particular is real because 
of t'\e reality of tIle idea of 'I>71!ich it partakes.. Knoi<;rledge of 
each particular is also val id because of its absolute referent, 
the idea, 
In summary, let us look a Plato's metaphor of tl'e divided 
line found in Book VI, A line is divided into tHO halves, "hich 
are in turn divided into halves, Each fourtL of the line represents 
a level of reality and a level of knmvledge. The first fourth of 
the line represents t'le lowest level of reality--shado,,,s, reflections, 
etc, KnoHledge gained from this level of reality is gained by 
conjecture. The second fourth of the line represents the second 
level of reality--objects, part; cu1ari 'des. Knowledge is gained 
bere by belief, This first half of the line is the Horld of 
sense experience. Tl�e second balf of tl,e line representa t1'e 
\'10rld of mind. The third four th of t;"le line represents 
intellectual constructs, based upon ,sense esperience. Kno,,,ledge 
is gained from this t',ird level by understanding. Last, Ute final 
fourth re.presents t:le. re.alm of the ideas; kno,,{Jledge !,'ere is rOillld 
by i"he exercise of reason", Here,. t�'.ent is Plato·s epistemology. 
Before He evaluate it, let Us first look at Plato's o"m 
cri ticisms in the Parmenides .. 
Al tl',ough Pla"co succeeded in ,establishing an episte:nological-­
ontological tbeory .v',ich supported and explicated t'l.e Socratic 
affirmatiOn of values and kno",ledge. be did not succeed in relating 
the t,,,o "'orlds of ',is theory of forms--tbe visible and tbe intelligible, 
Hence, because of this ontological fault, Plato's epistemological 
the.ory quakes and crumbles .. l.e t us see tl':e. crj�';cjSD' Plato directs 
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in ;Jie Parmenide.::: tOHard he relationsi'ip betlJeen tj-'ese t'i>JQ Horlds. 
Tbe discussion betv7een Socrates and P!lrmenides l:ere centers around 
the concept of participation. 
Socrates offers the concepi of participation as !:e relationship 
betueen an idea and eo.e particular--the latter partaking of the 
former. }IoHever, parmenides retorts thusly: ttThen each thing 
that pari:,Blms receives as its share either the form as a yJhole 
or a part of it. n If a particular par Licipa tes in the H:lole form, 
then tl'e form v70uld be con -1 ained 'Hi t>\ in each particular. 
Therefore, ffa form which is one and >e same Fill be at t;-'e same 
tiree, as a 't1101e, in a number of things which are separate, and 
consequently \'7i11 be separate from- itself." In short, a form 
isolated as a whole in a particular is not t!'e same as a form 
con tained in a second par icular of tbe same ca tegory. Hence, 
instead of one form for eae', category (say for oakness) a 
mul j-itude of forms Hould exist (one for each particular oak 
tree.) 
On t1\e 0 i:h:�r !:and, if a pnr! icular par'�·.alres in only part of 
the form, - en, 1'):8 forn,l \,rill be divided, cree ing something le.ss 
than t!:e original form tliato!each particular corresponds to. 
Tl-;us,. Parmenides concludes,. t1'.at since things cannot partake in 
forms as ''{;7Lole or in part, the concept of participation is 
inade.quate to decide t::e relations":,ip be t\,:een t'le ideas and t e 
particular. 
Socrates then replies tl�at ntl'ings are made in their (ideas) 
images and are likenesses; amd this par'; icipa-::ion tl)ey (the 
particulars) l�ave come to ave in t -'e FOrD.1S is no t;;ing but their 
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be ing rJ.ade. in :eir image .. 11 Parmenic1es an3'\°re.rs U:at if a particular 
is only � a form, it- is not identical 'crith tile. form. TJ-:erefore, 
a second form must exis'C for t'ce likeness of tl>e particular to the 
first form. But, since this likeness must be again only an 
image of t"e second form, a third form must exist for this second 
likeness as well. On and on it goes. 
711en, Parmenides drarcis the discussion tOV7tlrd t;;e crucial point. 
Tl>e forms, he states, are separate from any of' the par ticulars 
of sense experience: Hyott or anyon� else 't'11:0 asserts tl.lat each 
of them (the forms) has a real being 'just by itselft "'ould admit 
that no such real being exists in our l>?orld. tt These. forms are in 
"reference" only to each other and not to the particulars of this 
,"or1d ",hic\; He possess. P.nd the particulars of this ",or1d are 
only in "reference" to each other. Therefore, kno",ledge in our 
",orld can only be lmo>lledge of bis ;1or1d; for anything of this 
world is separate form t::e v?Orld of forms. 
l?armenides states this conclusion again in a different Hay. 
T"e form of l;no':71edge l:no'''' all te forms, ad tl:e knmvledge of 
man 10:10'\'78 the particularr of ';.:11e sense \vorld. HOi:Vever, since tbe 
;1orld of forms and the Norld of pariculars are separate, the 
J;nmvledge of man (part of the 1:1orld of particulars) is separate 
from and thus cannot know tl:e form of knowledge (part of the t10rld 
of forms). Therefore, because man cannot lmo," U:e form of l:not;ledge. 
all forms are unl:nowable. 
The sirnilarity of t!;is criticism to tl'�e criticism of Descartes! 
inate ideas by be empiricists indicates tt,at Plato "laS indeed 
l�enly aware of 'e difficulties "itll the theory of forms. 
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Hotveve.r, in spite of tbese difficulties Plato Iaaintnined tLe 
theory of forms because of his deep convictions of the objective 
existence of knoHledge and v!!lues; for ImO'vledge and values to 
be valid, tl:ey must have an ontological footing such as tl'e forms. 
For Plato stated in the Parmenides 
if • . .  a man refuses to admit that forms of 
things exist or to distinguish a definite 
Form in every case, he 'lill have nothing 
on uhich to fix his thought, so long as he 1:1i11 
not alloy] that each thing [laS a character iV'hich 
is alvmys the same; and in doing so, he "ill 
completely destroy the significance of all 
discourse. But of tl,at consequence, I think, 
you are only too Hell aHare. 
All of us, I believe, can appreciate Plato's attempt to 
establish kno'''ledge and values; ;"oHever, an underlying assumption 
of Plato '7hich actually determines the results of his endeavor 
is the "character '7hice is alv7ays the same." Plato felt that the 
particulars of th·is Horld are ah7ays changing and therefore could 
not be He absolute which knoHledge demands. Consequently, Plato 
developes a v'orld of forms as an absolute, entirely separate from 
this °h7orld of change. HovJeve.r, Aristotle, \vho took over t:':e 
Platonic system, met t]'e cri ticism in. the p.armenides by refuting 
this basic assumption of Plato: that no absolute can be found 
in H.e particulars "hich c},ange. ThUS, we "ill see t;,at 
Aristotle solves lobe relationship betHeen the Form and He 
par ticular by U:e rejec tion of t:· is underlying PIa tonic assurop lion. 
Aris totlianism 
.Aristotle sees the difficulty of Platonism as lying in 
Plato's assumptiOn that anything that changes cannot be tbe 
absolute referent tlat knot11edge demand:-. I n  Boole IV of the 
Hetaphysics Aristo'cle states t]- at they ttobserving that all tJ�i:-. 
indej'erminate substance is in motion, . . . supposed tba t it is 
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impossible to make any time staiiement about that which is in all 
ways and entirely changeable." Aristotle rejects this notion by 
implanting the forms ,dthin ti'e changing particular. T'·,us, ",hen 
a man Imo",s, i·e does not only Imo'" He world of t ,e particulars 
as Parmenides indicated; however. since t.e form is imbedded in 
the particular, Ie Imows t"e universal through imOHing the 
particular. 
Aristotle, needless to say. ci.'anges plato's ontology to 
support this position. Therefore, to understand is epistemology, 
,'Ie mus t firs t tmders tand is on [:ology and lio,,, it differs from 
ti,at of Plato. In Book IV of ti'e Hetap!'ysics Aristotle discusses 
Being as Being. Being as Being e terms substance. That "hich 
is substance, Aristotle states in Book V, is "tl.e ultimate 
subject wbic!: cannot be predica Led of some thing else" or "",hatever 
has an individual or separate existence,U independent of all 
else. If any predicate:' can be given of somet"ing, then i-t is 
dependent upon tliese predicates and is not substance. Joe Smith 
is a man. Joe is not a substance, for he is dependent upon Ulan. 
Again an apple is red: apples, being dependent upon the color 
red to be "hat they are, are not substance either. 
Substance, then, exist" conple/ely within i·tself. Its being 
depend only on itself" not upon r;lnything else.. Or a" llristotle 
says, furt�:er in Book J:1l ttsome t1-: ine;s are said t to be! bec.ause 
they are substance.s; ot- ere because they arc made of substances", 
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Thus, substance is absolute., unc' anging; i-� is primary to all 
else. T«erefore, "lmouledge is principally concerned "lith that 
which is primary, i. e. tl,at upon whicJ) all ot'·,er t\:ings depend. tI 
Note tha<i< Ue definiiion of substance by tlriscotle is quite 
similar to Platots definition of -:::l!e ideas. Also, Aristotle's 
assert:ion that k"110iilledge mus:: be based upon sue;-, a substance is 
similar to the reasoning that led Plato to assert ti:e ideas. 
Ho,ve-ver, as've shall see t'ie nature of substance differs greatly 
from Fai of Plato's ideas. 
Exactly ,<] 'at is this concept of substance from which all 
other modes of being are derived? In Tie Soul Aristotle breaks 
substance dOI;-ID into three divisions: form, matter? and a 
combination of these.. For a definition of t--ese t>ree -concepts 
let us turn to Book IX mf U!e Netaphysics. Here Aristotle relates 
matter to paten iali-:y, form to ac-<uality. Actuality, Aristotle 
sta es is "comple e reality." If something is actual, every possible 
aspect of it "as been realiz<?d. It is as fully re.alized as it 
can be.. Potentiality, on [".';e 0: 'er and, is ';:' e possibility 
Hof acting or being acted uponH --in S,'\orL, t.-:e. possibility or 
realization. 
Perlaps a specific example \Vill clarify. lin acorn can become. 
an oak :tree., This is an example of potentiality .. Tt',en tl·c acorn 
has become an oak treet Ll:e onk tree is an example of actuality 
in rela:-ionsl"ip '\0 t',e acorn. Since according ¥O Aris' ot1e in 
Book IX ttrorm is aC;'ualily,i1 t,Le oak Lrce. is also an example of 
form in rela-' ions":ip �'O " e acorn. Conversely, t:-:e. acorn is an 
example. of rna; te.r.. It should be noted t:,a t - e oak tree represen ts 
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PQten-Linlity 2.n(� TIlEl':ter in relation;> ip 0 firc';-70od, 11 ic repre.se.nts 
aC'l'uality and form in relationsl�ip to tLe oak trec .. There. fore , 
all things that conpose re.ality are a combination of potentiality 
or matter, and actuality or form, depending upon ti".e relationship 
that is being considered. 
With tl:is understanding of form (actuality). matter (potentiality) 
and tl:e combination of both, Ie t us e:-camine Lhese. three sub-
divisions in more detail. First, let us consider matter. Aristotle 
postulates iqhat he calls prime matter in Book IX of the Hetaphysics: 
Uif t.here is some primary stuff, 'Hhich is not further called the 
material of some other tbing, this is primary tnatter.tt Potentiality 
;;'7hich is not actualized in any ;;,;ay __ this is called prirne matter',' 
and fi�-.s t.he qualificatiOns of substance. For prime mat·ter cannot 
be predic<i:ed; it is not dependent on" anything else, but has a 
separate exisjence; and it is the source of all other "modes of 
being. t1 Therefore, prime matter is one ca'\;egory of substance. 
A second category of substance is form (actuality). 
Aristotle posits pure actuality Lrt 'terms of i'he pr,ime mover in 
Book XII. This prime form is pure thought--t hought about thought. 
Now thinking in i tse 1 f is concerned i>Ji t t ha t 
vJhich is in itself best, and thinl�ing in thE! 
highest sense 1;'7ith -"hat which is in the 
highest Sense best. And t1"_ought tit inks itself 
throu,,�h participation in U:e. object of -choug>,t 
by tl-e act of appreLension and thinkinl];, 80 
that thougLt and : !:e object of thoug:-t are 
one essence. 
Therefore, by form Aristotle means thought. Thought, form, or 
The third category of substance (Aristo01e calls i:i.em simple 
bodie ) are a c.omposi te of pure. form. and pure matter. Form has 
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actu21ized ma!'ter into one of "e p2ri'ictllars iiI: icl 1-'78 kno'iJ", The 
particular, however, is a. tmity of both its form and its matter. 
If ei tLer \vould be taI<:en from tl:e particular, prime rna t tar or 
pure form "'ould resul t. T,",erefore, the form and matter ",L ie!, 
vIe mo,," can exis t only in relationship to each other. TLe particulars 
of reality, f':o,\·;rever, are in':-,egrated 'tvith tl,ought, with form. 
Aristotle states U'at it is "'le forms Hhicl" we knOtv. C-onve.rsely, 
we can !mOH the particulars of this ,70rld, because of the form 
(the tl',ought) Hhich determines ne ac tuali ty the matter has taken. 
However, Aris totle in Book IX of the Metaphysics goes one 
step further. "}fatter exists potentially, because it may attain 
to tbe form; but uhen it exis ts actually, it is then in the form. n 
Therefore, only because of form can there be matter. Only because 
form can mal<e matter actual (or actualize potentiality), is there 
any potentiality at all. rtThat actuality is prios in formula is 
evident; for it is because it can be actualized t:,at t!l,e potential, 
in the primary (or substantial) sense is potential." Another 
tvay of expres ing the poin Aristotle makes in Book IX is that 
matter or potentiality is dependent upon form·or actuality to 
it its potentiality. Being dependent matter is not as great a 
substance as is actuality. Actuality must proceed potentiality. 
The.refore, in t1 e reality of t::e particulars H:�ich He !movJ, form 
or thought determines the actual expression of t:1atter. Thought 
is not only part of every par:. icular, but it is an essen Lial 
component of reality i�cself. Reality is C01Tlposcd of bot!! matter 
and form, bo-;:'- potentiality and actuality. Since men kno·u by 
thougl,t, accord,ing to Aris <otle, men can know re.ality \vhicb is 
partially composed and determined by thoug}-, -L . 
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This brings us finally :'0 Aristotle's �pistemology .. In Book 
III of de Anima Aristo, Ie s La. es t 'at "that part of t"JZ� soul, then, 
which '''' cail mind (by mind I mean that part of the soul by "hicll 
the soul thinks and forms judgments) )ras no actual existence until 
it thinks. n Tberefore, Ie t us not confuse tl-,e substance of tl:ought 
v7ith th:� abstraction of mind. Hind is the process of thinking. 
T':-:inking involves tHO procedures: one passive, ",vhich i:- perception 
of the form of particulars He experience. One is active, V7l>en 
one actually t ,inks Loug,ts. Thus, man's process of thinking is 
as all else of reality--potential and actual. It can rtbecomen 
the particUlar Ivhich (,le perceive--that is, through sense organs 
men can recognize t>le particulars that exist. Howeve.r t tlte procesf' 
of thinking also involves actuality, the t'inking of tl'ougbts. 
As the actuality in reality preceeds any potentiality in 
reali, y. so ac lneli ty or thought in be process of thinking preceeds 
any perception. Not only does tLis actuality in t' e mind imply 
t:'at knOI0'ledge is gained by act ivi y. no�c by passivity ( as bee 
empiricis is \Jill say) j but also at an affinity exist:, betHcen 
tLinking and reality; for form or e-·aug', t is an essential component 
of reality along Nit' matter. T: is same actuality wl�icL determines 
tb�_ form mat l-er takes is nresent in mnn \,i:en he. tbinJ;�o Tl�is is 
realism at its best--reality and uman thoug t i'ave an affinity, 
thus t e  latter can mOlY' and understand tie former; :'ol'JeVer. reality 
is not thought, but a combination of tLougit (form) and matter. 
Both form and matter are real; boU, are intertIJrned and interrelated, 
inter-dependent. BotL Hre a unity,. Neither could be uitLout 
the otl-ero 
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In summary of Aria totle' s position let us I'evie.%' three. paints: 
first, a comparison of Aristotlian form to ?latonic ideas; secondly, 
an examination to see if Aris otIe's epistemology is congruent 
'''ith ontology; thirdly. if Aristotle successfully ans!qered the 
criticism of 'e t'eory of forms found in Fe Parmenides. First, 
",hile Plato's ideas are endrely separate from t e particulars 
wl·,ic; are images of V-oem, Aristotle's form is an essential part 
of eac" particular. vir He plato's idea" exis t independently of 
matter and vice versa, Aristoile's forms, exist only in relationship 
to rna tier and matter only in relations,ip to form. Al Lough pure 
form--pure actuality or t ought about thought--c1oes exist, tie 
individual forms suc' as oakness or mf\nness exist only in particular 
oak trees and particular 'men. Bot' Platonic ideac and Aristotlian 
forms are '''hat we ImoH; however, the former are Imown by tLe 
exercise of reason wit1'out sense percep t ion, \v;- ile ti e latter 
are ImoIVn by reason (actuality or t'oug>t) tj'rough sense perception. 
Does Aristotle ,Iii' lese modifications in te theory o f  
forms succeed as Hell in establish.ing a companion ontology as 
did is predececsor? Aristotle's ontology, as we have seen, 
centers around the concept of snbstance, '''hich in turn narrows 
dow'Tl to t',e prime-mover--pure actuality, pure tb:oug"t. Since 
it is tLis pure ac.t�ality t',at actualize," matter or potentiality, 
ttOl1g;'t lies at t: e center of reality as an essen;:ial cons-tituente 
Because man tl:inks thoug!ts, he can then under tand reality. 1 
believe tl,at Aristotle indeed succeeded in establishing an 
ontological foundation for his epistemology. Perl'aps it should 
be clarified tl'at pure form is no';- a form, but form; not a thought, 
but tl1oug l : t .  Fron th ir� pure :i:orm and pure n121:,ter are. produced 
the Dar iculars '1;,70 knoi}. 
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Final ly, le i' us con s ider Aris totle ' s  anSV1er \'0 Parmcnides t 5  
cri ticism of t 1 - e  t';oo1'Y of form: . Parmenidesscri ticism vias th.at 
forms, 'ETbicn do provide an, absolute Hhich make Imov71e.dge and 
values val id ,  are. sepal'a '.6 from t�'e. forms in t e Horld v-7e. k-no't>J 
and are. thus unknovlable. Aristo'! Ie in i:er t<:'7ined tLe f orms in t � :e 
particulars of V -:e. 't,;orld '\Je kn01v; tl'!e.reforet a1 thou,,:;ll 1'78 knoH only 
particulars , through and in t l'e particulars He knot} universal 
formS 't<rhich can serve as absolute ::; "  
In closing on Aristotl ianism, le t us look once more at 
'(he forms. T' -6 form- are. thoughts. They are tmiversals .. 
How-ever, these un iversals are s imilar to' tl'e thoughts 'Ie " ',ave. I 
hesitate to use t'--e 'Hord idea because of its Platonic over tone ;·� ; 
but the forms serve as focusing points for men ;;']'.en -j: ey ImoH .. 
Therefore , e tmiversality of kno1;vledge gained by Plato ' s  ideas 
is s ti l l  preserved by Ar istotle ' s  forms .. 
Nedieval Thought 
Uedieval t hought can be seen as a reHorking of t he controversy 
betHeen Plato and the Sopbists VJith a solution being reached in 
terms of conce.pt ional i sm, a somel7hat Platonic Aristotl ian ism. 
The restaging of this - once solved controversy began ,;;ith a revival 
of Platonism in the third century A. D o  Plotinus ·took several 
aspects of Plato ' s  thougbt--mysticism, vieHpoin t of jmoVlledge , 
univer sal s ,  and a qualif ied otherHorldiness--and developed them 
in to a full-f ledged mys t ical pp.i1osopl1y--Neoplatonism. Because 
Augus tine took Neorla ton ism in to Christianity. rIa ton ism entered 
into early medieval thought. 
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Early medieval tt'inkers sue: fJ "  John Sec-tus cont:Ln.ued ti-:e 
Neoplatonic emphasis upon ' e  more real �-!orld-- tl:e. 110rld of God. 
The t ' , oughts of God Here i: ,e ideas of Plato. Bence , reality laid 
vJi th the idea s ,  vrhile the par ticulars of this ,'?orid ( the lOHe s t  
level of being) 'cad only a sbado" o f  reality. This position "as 
developed in tO e middle pe iod into medieval real ism. l<lill iam of 
Champeaux and Anselm represent nis pos i tion--t' ,at un iversals are 
real en titie s ,  Hhile the particular s of this 'JOrld are vwrdly 
real at all. 
Against tl;is pos ition U ,ere arose nominalism--only t 'e 
particulars of t' e ,'?orld are rea l ,  ",hile un iversals are no more 
than abs tractions \¥e use. for s implicity in thought. Roscelin 
represen ts t" is po s i tion . Of course nominal ism with its emp" asis 
upon the individual Und -t -e par : -iculars was in oppos i t ion to tl--e 
neoplatonic C ' , ris ::ianity vJith' its universal and ot ,erHorldly emphasis . 
Behind nominalism, <',oHaver, was t e  beginn ing of a social revolution 
which "as to end in t' e Renas s iance . T erefore a t:\!J?B of Christianity 
had to be fotmd to replace neoplatonic Chris tianity, vlhich 1;Jould 
give a place to [�e individual and the particular. 
The beginning? of b is ne," philo sophical foundation can be 
seen in conceptualism. Abelard in conceptua lism solved the 
realis t --nominal is t con troversy along 1 mes sQTIlewhat s imilar to 
Aris totle · 8  revision of Platonism. Universals are not 't>,e idea�" ; 
but, rat' er are ratIter men tal products HhicL do have objective 
validi'�:y emong i'l'e particular s .  TLus t al though abstrac tions from 
par !'icul ars, universals do represen t un iversal aspects o f  particulars .  
T l i0. conoeption or universals are forrncd by 
abstractions . .. . ..  In relation to abstrac tion 
it must be kno,;n that matter and form alv"ays 
subsist mixed tOf;e the.r, but tLe reaSon of mind 
',;as this power, t l , a t  it may nOH consider mat ter 
itself; i t  may now turn its a t temtion to form 
alone. (The Glosses of Peter Abelard upon 
Porphyry) 
Althougt, tl ,ese abstrac tions do exis t in ti'e man ' s  min d ,  tLey are 
also present in tl:e particulars vie experience. 
St. Thomas in tie t h irteenth century, after the rediscovery 
of Aristotle forged an Aristotl ian Christianity to replace the 
Platonic C!'ristianity. In so d O ;'4;he took over !,ristotle ' s  
epistemology and Aristotle " s  analysis of thinking. Tl'e pas s ive 
intellect receives sense perception. The active intellect 
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abstracts the f orms from the particular. These f orms are ,·,hat vIe 
d o  knOi'] or recognize in t he. particulars. 
"Hith conceptionalism and Thomisffi, medieval real ism slowly 
dies a'\vay. Actually', ho'\vever , nominalism gained the day. 
Hill iam of Occam, f o l l ovJing the century of Aristotlian victory, 
again completely rejected the forms in terms of a re-s ' atement 
of nominalism. Occam fel tha t tJ:e f orme did not represent entities, 
but rati'er ,only a collection of individual particulars wl,ici we 
have experienced. Thus un iversals or forms are symbols of a large 
number of particular example s ,  but t hey themselves d o  not have 
any ontological status . occam did not feel as PIa Lo that tie 
f orms t:Jere neces sary for l:nowlec1ge--a presuppos ition of Occam 
14bich \'las taken owr by many w.odern thinker " 0 
Before closing with medieval thought I would l ike to comment 
that the medieval vievrpoint of Aristotlianism is through a 
Pla : onistic in terpre tation. For although Ti'oma: did use many 
25 
Aris ·;';o ;·,lian ca i e.f:Ories to build a syn 'i: esis of f:1ed ieval ;houg1-; t ,  
the reaul-: was a soee:Hhat Platonistic Aristotle.. T::e t,\10 particular 
examples t<Tl:ic:: concern us are Thomas t s conce.pt or forms and of 
abstrac i ing by the mind. 
Aristotle did not apeak of ttabstractingH forms from t: e 
particular at; did t ' , o  concep tualists from 't'71iom Thomas gained tl',e 
concept; rather. for Aristo :ole forms can exist only in particulars. 
Aristotle never was faced as VIas Abelard and Thomas with the 
problem of ti--e on oJ.ogical s ta tus of forms or miversals in tl e 
mind. Universals in t1:e mind lead us bac!;; once Hare to Platonism 
and medie.val realism. nance, Occam's cri ticsm of Tl10mism that 
it had solved nothing concerning tLe tmiversals is, I believe . 
jus t if ied. For af ter :ohrowing Platonicm out the fron t door, 
ThoEas brough t it in t hrougll e back door. 
But Thomas made another digre.s:--' ion from Lristotle.. To 
Aristotle, though-; S '('lare the source of kno�11edge, not mind. 
}find exis t.cd onl;?" if there ivere. tII.oughts. Thef3e thoughts did 
not abn trnct forms f rom particulars , but recognized forms 
(thoughts )  in tLe particular. Thi? development of mind as the 
seat of i:::noVlledge 'Has tar..en over by modern philosophy_ 
A more subtle reason exis t s ,  hO'Hever ,  a'e' to th? differences 
be.tHeen Aristo -'- le' r- ?nd ThoTIl2. s ' s  thouf�;-tt .  11le question ixisto t le 
ans;lJe.red Ha'? on tolor;ical--t,Jhat is u,-c relationship bet'\veen the 
\-'forld of -;-- �e par t.iculars and t;:8 i"lorld of forms tLat are. necessary 
to  kno1;v tl'e. par ticulars.. The. question t;�a t Abelard deal t i>7i th 'tvas 
an ans't<'1'cr concerning '::hc ontological tUB of universals. As 'He 
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shall see, this confus ion of: ans' ering a que s tion concerning 
pyscoology in te.rms of an an :'ilBr deal ing wit) ontology \vill play 
havoc <lith much of modern thought. For much difficulty bas resulted 
in modern thought from confusing pyschology v7ith ontology. 
Galileo and Science 
Bet,veen Wil l iam of Occam and the victory of nominalism and 
Descartes ,  the so-called "father of modern philosophy, " t here 
is an important development in <lestern t hought--the use of 
science. To understand this ne.,] ap 'roach which so influenced 
Descartes and there fore most preceeding philosopby, let us look 
at the t l ought of Galileo. For in his thoug h t  can be seen the 
un ion of the empirical and rational mathematical spirits ,qhich 
compo se science. 
On one hand vJaS the tradition of such men as Francis Baeon 
v1ho emphas ized observation and experimentation. On the otl1e.r hand 
vJere suel men a Kepler and Copsrnicus who represent tLe speculative 
tradi t ion based on a mathematical rationalism. Galileo succeeded 
in bringing both t1<'ese tradi tions toge ther to form nmoden1tt s c ience. 
For Gal ileo ' s  assump tion was this : the real v70rld is rational in 
nature ; its ra ionality can be expressed in terms of matl'ema tic s ;  
and this rationality ean be ascertained from s tudying particular 
examples" 
T l : e  assertion that t h?  un iverse i' rational--that is , that 
it can be unders ::ood by rr.en--is U'e old Greek affirmation. 
HOHever , the emphasis on t e particular example fotmd in sense 
percep tion stand in contras 'c to the Platonic rationalism of 
antiqui : y  and to t h e  main s tream of n1edieval thougJ,t . This 
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contribut ion;- :;arre froEl nominalism, v7] ,ich asser i'ed tl�at only tLe 
particulars are real . Hence , we shall see t� at in modern pILilosophy 
one of these tT,�10 aspects of s c ience is alway empbasized over the 
o tl:er. For only in Ariatotl ianism have He found a sys tem ,.lhich 
combines rationalism and the part icular of senSe experiEmce into 
a unified sys tem. Although Aristotl ianism Hould provide a basis 
f or the netq sc ience , the early moderns rejected Aristotle, perhaps 
because of Thorr.as '  somel" } at Pla :onic in terpre taiion of him. 
Galileo bel ieved that t: e new science dealt Hith reality. 
Therefore , V,e real Horld is 'h e Horld of phys ics--matter. Only 
quan tities of h is matter are real ; for mathema t ical science only 
deals with quan tities such a:, volume, weight, and d iutensions . 
Any qualities such as color, texture, sme l l ,  or sound did not 
actually exist in the real VIorld of mat er ttat the ne" ma tl,ema tical 
science disclosed. The quantities that phys ics disclo::ed, Galileo 
termed primary qualities because U ,ey des cribed t):e real "'orId _ _  
matter in motion. The qualities of color, sme l l ,  and etc. are 
called secondary qual i ties ; for !:l ese exis" not in the real world , 
but in tl�e perce iver � '" 
llro'\1 much of this descrip tion of the ureal tt world Galileo 
took from Atomisn is a diff icult ques tion. Certainly a large 
s h are of i t  did cone from trois ancient philosophy" Atomist"s 
real ity of a e oms moving in the void is similar to Gal ileo ' s  
real i ty o f  bodies of matter in mo tion . Cer tainly Galileo ' s  
dis tinction of pr imary and secondary quali ies 1 ad its roots in 
the A tomist ' p  thoug h t ..  Also Galile.o ' s  real 'Horld v]aS entirely 
based on tl'e sense. of > ouc1- 8'" Ha . Democritus 1 8 (>  Therefore; I 
once more. For la",t �r philosophy 'tIns to demonstrate only to 
clearly this is an arbitrary distinc ion about the value of 
certain sense ; and thus the distinction bet,,,een pr imary and 
r 
seconda;'Y qualities Hill be exposed as being quite fallacious. 
Yet. Galile o ' s  thoug h t  is irnl'lensely impor tr; 
of modern philos oplry; for descrip tion of reality v7aS 
carried over doviih into tba n ineteenth cen tury. rieHton 'Has to 
even further extern this concept of reality in to a vast machil1e 
of indestructi'll!le bodies in motion. l'LoHCver, this conception o f  
real ity gave rise t o  grave pbilosop h ical problems ; f o r  thought. 
val tID, and t' e "'orld of human experience are al ien to this v10rld 
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of matter in motion. The endeavors of preceeding philosophy Here 
largely to at ;:empt to f ind a placEll for an epis temology that Hould 
support knowledge, values , and the "orld of experience in terms 
of tbe ontology Galileo developed. 
T homas Hobbes sharpens the is sues greatly in his t !':oughtc 
The ne,,, science reveals a ,,,arId of matter in motion, a v]orld devoid 
o f  the qual ities of the ordinary world of human experience. Hence, 
lfobbes states in Human Nature that: 
Whatsoever accidents or qual ities our senses 
make us think t here be in the:,''Horld, th!'Y be 
not there, but are seemings and appari tions only : 
the things that are ill the Horld v7ithout 
us are t:'ose motions by ",hicIt these seemings 
are cause,d. And this is the great deception 
of sense. 
Hobbes clearly shows that in the 'vorld of real ity, the Horld 
of tTIe neH science, the ,,'orld of experience--of colors , values, 
etc--� n o  ontological status, but are deception. For real 
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being i s  matter in mo r ion ; real being ' s  c arac -ceris tics are only 
t;<e quan tit_a tive measureme.n t s  t ' , a t  tne. nBi} mathematical sc ience 
f ormed by Galileo can make . Hence , our "'0t\Id of sense experience . 
of value , of knOlvledge i s  a deception. 
Tlerefore, to unders tand modern p ilosophy and modern epistomology, 
it is essential t at vIe se.e t e impor anee of Galileo t s  ;;'10rk--1: is 
foundation of ma t�'ematical science ,  his as smnp t ion t at t is neiv 
s c ience revealed L e  real tvor Id, and h i s  description of F is real 
l>Jorld in terms of A-: omisll1 _ _  a mechanis tic ma--oerialism. Finally in 
Hobbes mus t be seen tiie apparently logical resul t of Galileo ' s  work: 
a mecrlanistic universe entirely alien to man ' s  "'orld of qual itie s ,  
value s ,  and Imool1edge. For Descar tes\ thoug ht can only be unders tood 
against this con text; for his s truggle "as to relate t,)Je \Iorld of 
matter in mot ion to the ,"orld that man experiences .  
Before moving on to Descartes , I "'ould l ike to comment upon 
ti e adequacy of a meci anis Hc materialism as an ontological bases 
for t 'e ne", s c ience . He " ave seen that to describe as t e real 
'V-lorld a \'.1orld based largely on t e sense. of touch, and t: erefore 
to discredit the other senses is a fallacy. For as Berkeley will 
point out touc! is a sense . If Fe other senses do not describe 
reality, neither does touch; for touch mus t exist in t�e perceiver 
just a s  much a c  any otYer sense experience doe s .  There fore, no 
reason exists t,o belie'\.� the sense of touch is les'�, subje.c ,tive 
than any other senses .  HOV1Cver , a deeper con f l ic t  exists bettveen 
t1" 6 navJ science and A tomism. The new s c ience reveals , says 
Galileo, a world of matter in mo r ion. But tile ne" science involves 
not only sense exper ience ( in this case tt e sense of touch) , but 
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also a rational e leU1..cnt o f  speculative mathema t ic s .,  Yet ,  in a 
mechan istic material un iverse any rationality is completely alien ,  
a s  al ien a s  are colors , smel l s ,  valne s :  or for that matter, there­
fore , rationality, the very basis of msthematics, is a "deception " .  
Therefore , n o t  only Hill sensc-experiemc e ,  one essential c omponent 
of science be discredited as being a l ien to the real "JOrId , but 
rationality, the second component o f  science, tvill also be discredited, 
when Locke lampoons Descartes ' inate ideas . Thus , Galileo ' s  
ontology of mechanistic materialism cannot support the net" science 
he formed . The resul t ,  as He shall see, is the scepticism of 
David Hume . 
Descartes 
To understand Descarte s '  contribution to modern philosophy 
and to epistemology, let us first look at the dilemna Vlhich he 
inheri ted from Galileo. Like Galileo, Descartes assumed the rationality 
of t he universe , e s pecially in terms of mathematics and tl'e validity 
of the sense of touch. And l ike Galileo Descartes acccpted and 
praised the ne" s c ience formed by the merger of mathematical 
rat ionalism and empiricism. Lil<e Galileo Descartes as sumed that 
the new science revealed the. Ureal V-lorldff-_a Horld of matter in 
motion , governed by cause and effect. Unl ih£ Galileo, Descartes 
realized the problem that existed : hm; in a mechanis tic material ism 
could there be a place for rationali ty and sense experience that 
science demands co 
Descarte s ,  therefore , sought to develop a pos ition ,;hich 
,;ould allot" for not only rationality and sense experience, bue also 
for values and theology. He bel ieved that he found a solution 
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in h i s  substan ti::l dualism.. Ttvo aspe c ts o f  rea l i ty e.xis t--mind and 
matter. Descartes describes each in the jkistotlian category of 
subs tance . Each one is a subs tance--independent of each other, 
unaffected by each. Each subc tance has its own nature ; each is 
governed by i t s  ONn laNs e Or as Descarttes states in the Principles 
of Philosophy :  
By substance "le can understand nothing else 
than a thing ,.,hich so exists that it needs no 
o t her t h ing to exist • • • •  There is alNays one 
principle property of a subs tance ",hich con s ti­
tutes its nature and e s sence, and on "hich 
all else depend s .  Thus, extens ion in length, 
breadt h ,  and depth constitute the nature o f  
corporeal subs tance ; and thought con s t i tutes 
tl1e e s sence of thinking substance. 
From this superf icial explanation, Descartes substan tial 
dualism seems to solve the dilenma ; for the nen sc ience indeed 
describes a real v70rld , while rational ity, value s ,  and sense. 
experience ; � ave a i>iorld in 'Hbid' t 'By are not alien", H01;'JeVCr , 
Descartes s t i l l  bas problems. Nan knoHs ",ith mind ; but if mind is 
entirely separated from rnatter, hOv7 does mind ever knoV-7 anytbing 
about matter? Ye. t, t1;e ne'V-I science , Descar t e s  fe. l t ,  did eive 
correct informati6n to ti e mind about rna terial reality. Ho", 
could this be? 
To overcome this diff icul ty, Descartes develops his theory of 
ide.as. To be sure , since mind is only in Hreference.H to mind, 
it can only kn0'01 e contents of mind. Thus , s ince tl�e contents 
of mind are ideas, a mind can only know the. ideas it cont£l,inso 
11ovJeve.r , DeSCDr -Les main taine.d t" ,81- the ideas 'He have. re.present the. 
substance of matt:er .. These ideas represent sense experience and 
are called adven ti tious i(1Cas. In contrast to t l:ese adven t i t ious 
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certain truth� He.re in the i.11n/�; te ideas l ies the gre.atest, knm<rledge ; 
for here lies the basis of me-thematic£; and ra tional ity . T' e innate. 
ideas actual ly are s imilar to Plato's ide a ' , excep t  innate ideas 
exist in tl e substance. of mind.. HOh!'cver 1 
absolute refere.n ts for knoHledgc. 
also serve as the 
By t his theory Descartes hoped to establish the rationality 
and senSe exper ience. sc ience deman d c-i .. But Descarte::; gave a 
greater emphas is to the f ormer tl:an the. latter.. Inn a , e ideas ftre 
clear, s ic (. l;u:� + ,  in'�:iutively cer £lin , while. adven t itious ideas 
are Lazy, ambiguous , uncertain. TI;us, Desca.rte s t" s pos ition in t�-:e 
f inal rcsul i- is � i  F:ilar to PIa on ism.. � $f:ould have s t udied the 
Parmenides i many s inils,r criticisms 'Here Ilk'1de of his thoug: t as 
'\vere made by Parmenides of the theory of idea�, .. Locke Hould Soon 
l ampoon t>e innate ideas , des troying t: e basis for rat� iona l i sm in 
Descarte s '  system. Berkeley l70uld soon poL."1t o u t.  t '  a �,<e actual ly 
r..ave n o  Imo;;,;ledge of ma t ter t bu" only of ideas ; t } ;ere rore , He haw 
no r ight to say i t  exi s ts ,;. Finally Ilurne v-ia.c' tv point out that 1'7C r)O 
have kno'\vledge of mind , but ratLe.r only ideas ; t >�erefore? vlB 1'.:1,"78 
no rig1 �� t to say mind exis t �· .. But we shall examine these. 
critic isms in gre ater de:tail later. 
'H:lat is t : :e. source of d iff icul ty? Tl-�e source is that the 
ontoloEfi' of rrtec1'an i s tic mater ial ism is in direct opposi�t ion to 
the on ;�ological basis demanded by the epis temology of tLe nev.I 
s c ience. Descarte s ' s  difficul -> ies resulted in trying to relate 
this on tology [;ained from Gal ileo (rnec ; ' an i s t ic material ism) to the 
epi<temology of the ne.'\i] scien ce (rational re.alism)o 
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To be sure. De-scar es DOS tula i'_ed a sub L:tance H],ic 1 Has r:;1tionally 
constructed and in Hhic: values, tlJougL t ,  and sense experience have 
meaning., But this is t e substance of m i nd. T);e substance vl hic h 
the ne", science describes in terms of rationality (mat!ema tics) 
and of sense experience ( touch) is still as alien to either a e  
i t  ,,,as Hith Hobbes. For the substance of ma t ter is only ma tter 
in motion; ' enee, ra tionality and thoughtaY� still meaningless ; ereOll 
Preceeding philosop" y  inherited t ,is difficul ty of Cartesian phil­
osophy; actually, it has been brOUg11t dm,m to the present day. 
The fact ti'at science does ,"ork Hith its assumptions of the 
rational nature of ti le sensory ,"orld is one of ti,e strongest pieces 
of evidence against mecbanistic ma terialism. For to work s �iences t 
asstD11ptions about reality must be valid ; tl�ege assumptions a s  we 
have seen conflict \'li th mechanistic materialismOll 
Early Empiricism 
On t!" e continent uas gro'tV'ing a s c hool of philosophy 'tJl- ich 
emphasized rational truth,. tl'e innate ideas, and mat;',ematic� + This 
tradition of Spinozoa and Leibniz follo,,"'€!d in the footsteps of 
Descar t es .,  However, <1m tl e Bri tish Isle.s there " ad arisen anotber 
philosophical tradition through be worKs of Francis Bacon and 
Thomas Hobbes. Bacon had emphasized observation as a means to 
truth. Pd)bbes had declared that all lcnoHledge is a result of 
sensation and t1;at t l ' ese sensations are the only source of 
knO''tV'ledge. only because He can name tt'-ase sensations can we t; ink; 
for t'" inking is simply a manipula ion of names. Further, Hobbes 
said that our tt Ougi,ts folloH in a sequence as do our sensationsOll 
Therefore, \,78 tend to as ' o ciate t>_c tf'oug;'ts and the. sensationsOll 
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British philosophy, then, had de.veloped tHO diffe.rent characteristic s "  
One ",as an extreme nominalism, Only the Horld gained in sense-
experience is real. Only particulars have ontological status; 
hence universals, or innate ideas for that matter, are meaningless. 
Our only source of 1.-nowledge is experience of particulars. Secondly , 
British philosophy approached philosophy in terms of pysc!101e>gy. 
This approach is valid, if one realizes the difference be1-,,,een 
pysci'ology and philosophy. However as ",itb Abelard and ",itL S t. 
Thomas preceding British philosop'1ers made ontological assertions 
on the basis of pyschological investiga tion. Therefore, it is 
against this context that John Locke, George Berkeley, and David 
Hume were to attack Cartesian ism. 
Immersed in this empirical tradition, Locke rejected Descartes ' 
innate ideas. However t he C!ccepted Descartes' tv70 substances; he 
accepted Descartes theory that mind kno"'s its ideas. Descartes 
had claimed t" at t'lere exists certain ideas in every man' s  mind 
from birth. These ideas are in tui tively certain. Thus . these 
innate ideas provide an absolute universal basis for truth. 
Locke asserts that all ideas come from experience (sensation) .  
The mind , Locke fel t ,  does not possess any "innate" ideas before 
'''''' have experience; but after experience tvrites on the blank sl eet 
of mind , mind can form from these simple ideas more complex ones. 
Our mind, then, is at first a blank tablet on which sensation creates 
ideas. Therefore, because al l ideas come from sensa j ion or from 
the combination of ideas 11' ich originally came from sensation, 
Locke concludes that talk of inborn ideas is f oolishness. 
Thus, Imowledge for Locke is of ideas, either simple or 
complex, whic :'- i" ad t ;eir origin in sense experience� As Locke 
stated in � Es say Concern ing Ht1TI1art Unders tanding : 
Since mind , in all its t hoUlS t and reasonings 
hath nn other immedia i e  objects but its 0',11 
ideas "1hic h i t alone can or does con template, 
it is eviden t that our !<no;;ledge is only 
conver,sant about th.em� Knowledge tben seems 
to me t o  be nothirl,g but perception of the 
connec tion of and agreement, or disagreement 
and repUolfnancy of any of our ideas. 
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Thus Locke undercut the source of rationality in Descarte s ' s  position 
--the innate ideas . k' 1'!Ume ",ould s bo,v, no longer ",a·' tllere any 
basis of rationality in the Cartes ian philosophy, Locke , ho'W�r, 
a ttemp ted to construct a basis for rationality in terms of 
senaa don ; but l'aving no mttological basiS, this attempt failed. 
Although Loc1".e \,ras crit ical of Descarte s ' s  innate ideas , he 
acce p t ed Descarte s ' s  substantial dualism and Descarte s ' s  theory of 
Immving--knmvledge by ideas, ",bich represemt bodies in motion. 
Locke ' s  disputes Hith DeCccirtes Here not about t' e ideas being the 
objects of knoVJing, but rat 1 er about tl'e origi-n and nature of these 
ideas. 
George Berkeley took over Locke ' s  modified form of Cartesianism, 
but added anot ;·er criticism, the criticism of Descarte s ' s  theory of 
a material substance. Both Descartes and Locke had accepted the 
conce.pt of sub s t an ce .  Both af3sumed t ha t  tHO kinds of being exis t 
--mind and matte.r. HOt�ver, iD reje.cting Descarte s · s  innate ideas , 
Locke crea�CBd a problem; for it was in terms of t1:e innate ideas 
!tis. rea c oning "as thii!l : because I can doubt ·that I exist, I mus t  
exis t ;  thus l Imo!·, I exis t. To knov] I exi s t ,  I must have a mind. 
But my mLtd is f in ite ; ti�s , t:zere must be. an infinite. mind, God, 
from '\>1hich my finite mind came. To be God , this infinite mind 
Bust be 
• Since this in -E ip mind is it \1ould 
not dece.ive f,\6 givin;� me ideas of a mate.r ial 'uorld \vhich did 
not exis t .  lIenee" a l.'!1£lt:�rial subs tance must exis t ... 
3 6  
The f irs t ide.a co n tained in tl�is reasoning i s  \'711n. 1' Dcsc.artes 
calle.d an inna >e idea; for ttl think; therefore I am'H is intuitive.ly 
certain l',e fel t "  But Locke could not use innate. ideas , after re-
je.c t ing tl'{�m, to de:m.on s trate ' e exis tence of a material substance . 
Frence, Locke. decalred that the prj:qlary qual i �:ies of 1'Ieig h t ,  mot i ort ,  
volUl!te " d il'rrensions s hov? to us '': h3 material t:<7orld and t hIS arc evidence 
of i t s  exis te.nce ... 1ToHevcr ,  a l l  other sense experience of the 
tnaterial Horld are. secondary q ualitie s ,  represen t ing not t;:e 
mtt -i:erial '>7orld , but our ic1e e. s .  
Berkeley, hOH8ver t vias quick to point out the. fallacy in this 
posi tion. In tt!e principles of HlUllan Knowledge Berkeley rightly 
concludes :  
T',;ey ,;<]ho assert that f igure., mo'I:ion and the rest 
of t� e prit:k'1ry or original qual i tie:; do exis t  
i'lithout ti ,e mind, in tUlthinking substance, do 
at tl-'e samE! -;-ime ackno\qledge that ('"010ur8, sound s ,  
hea'�� , cold , and suchl ike secondary qualitie s ,  
d o  not ; 'tV'hich tell us are sensation s ,  existing 
in t: e mind alone .. .. ... '" But I des ire anyone 
to reflect, and try "Jhether he can, by any 
abstraction of thought, conceive the extension 
and motion of a body vlithout a l l  the oUer 
sen s ible quali t ies 4" .. .. ..  In short, exten s ion, 
f igure , and motion, abs tract from all otl ',er 
qualities, are inconce.ivable ... 'Im-:e.rc , ti'erc­
fore , t1'£ othe.r sensib18 qual ities arc , tl)ere. 
must be. also, to \vi t-, in the mind and nOHhare 
else. 
Ber�ley r ightly observes that tl e pr imary qt1::'llities are as 
much sense experience a s  are. t e secondary qua l i t ie.s. There fore, 
s ince. man knOllS only i"hl' o�m ideas , man knovlS only !'is ideas in 
primary qual i ties {just a.s much as secondary ; for no reDl d if f erence 
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cxist:s be tuecn t em. All that Uf} experience as 8z:is are ideas ; 
s ince experience is t 'e only source of lmov71edge, ( inna te ideas 
having been rejected) we ave no knoHledge of a material substance. 
BBrkeleYt then, extends t! e result of this conclus ion. If we have 
no kno'tvledge of a material substance , "'T:-'icf' vie apparently do not, 
'tV'e have no basis for claiming that it exis ts. 
Berkeley· s  criticism of Locke ' s  modified form of Cartes ianism 
is quite justif ied ; however, Dec cartes used innate ideas no only 
to support tha exis tence o f:  a material s ubs tance but also t],e 
substance of <,'he min d .  Therefore, \<71:en Locke discredi ted tl:e 
itmate ideas, he des troyed no , only ' : 'e basis of the material 
substan ce, but also t" e basis of the ;:;ub;;tance of mind as 1<rell. 
David Hume , the Scottish sceptic, finally concluded ti e criticism 
Loclre began. 
Descartes support of - " e sub 2 tance of mind "(vas t h is : I 
d oubt ; t: erefore , I tl' ink. I think; V ereiore , I am. To thinl, 
a mind mus t exist ; ['·ence, t 'ere mus t  be a substance of mind. 
Descartes c l a ime.d tl1at the:se ideas- v-lere innate __ that i s ,  that 
this certainty is obvious, intuitive. However. Hume a' Berkeley 
accepted Locke ' s  reject.ion of U:e innate idea s ,  although I:e too 
accepted that we know only idea ' . Hume s imply carried Berkeley ' s  
cri ticism o f  a material subc tance over to the subs tance o f  mind. 
Aecording : 0  Loclre, V,e only lmotvledge "Je have is from 
sensation s ,  ivhich create idea:-· 0 i'le, tLen , only knOVl our ideas. 
Hume accepted this and declared ti e e ideas are s imply copies of 
t e  impress ions ,VB have experienced .  But He receive n o  impress ion 
of a substance of mind. },.ll that 't'Je are. irnpressed by are: 
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par �-_iclilar s ..  Hence " a l l  '\-18 lenov] arc a series of idc[l-': about 
particulnr impre.s ion s .  S L1'1ce He. receive. no ip1,pre. s s ions of mind , 
i\-18- have no Tigl�t to speak of a substance. of mind. All that lie. 
knovJ are impres s ions and ideas . T?,us , Rume ends in comple te 
scepticism--no mi,11.d , no matter" 
Most of us "{'iould accept this crit icism of Descartes,_� s innate 
ideas", To speak of ideas whic �-; are inborn in every individual and 
\vhich are in 1:ui tively cer -Lain seems 1 ike foolisl ness to US9 
HOHever, the problem goes deeper than the innate ideas . It 
penetrates to the roots o f  Cartesianism; for the whole philosophical 
endeavor of Descartes had been to reconcile the epistemology demanded 
by the nevI s c ience "ith an imcompatible ontology--mech'mistic 
materialism. As ,va have seen , an ontology and epis temology gro,' 
out of eaclk ot her and are dependent upon each other. The p hilosophy 
of David Hume represents tl:e futility of Descar tes ' s  attempts. 
It is d if f icult not to Honder Hhy these philosophers did not 
realize "here the problem laid . But each seemed to accept vThat 
his predecessors developed an i to criticize this inherited philosophy 
vrithout re-analyzing Cartesianism to f ind the diff iculty. But 
before II¥ cwing on to Kant and his solution to the scep ticism of 
il!lume, let us s tudy more closely this pjiilosophy of Hume , not only 
to more adequately unders tand Kan t ' s  thought, but to undersfand 
the n ineteenth and tvrentieth cen tury empiricism. 
Ii ") ":;  
Hume--the 'Founder of Hooern Philosophy 
David Hume is credited ,vith the founding of the variety of 
empiric.ism of the n ine teenth and t:;;qentie.th centuries.. Therefore , to 
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understand tha ori�in s  of t 'is later empiricism, let us re:viCTJ 
tbe earlier empirical tradi-tion, lV:'ici-' preceeded Hume and t" en 
From t '_0. tiIT'{3 of Hill iam of Occam, extreme nominalism gre.w 
as a philosop'dcal force in England. Francis Bacon l:ad ftlrt" ered 
this emp!:asis on tLe particular f ound in senSe experience . Thomas 
Hobbes had scoffed at universals or forms declaring them ,to be 
only name s .  Thus , Hobbes concluded that all 1Je knov' are sensations ,  
gained from sense-experience and from Hhic!: He gain ideas . Both 
these men stand in t h is extreme nominalistic tradition, s tarted 
in England at tt,e l ime of Occam and Roger Bacon. 
After Descartes had a t tempted to rec.oncile t le netv science 
and Atomism, Locke gave a ne,v tuist to this groHing nominalistic 
tradi tion--an emphasis on pyschology, on the origin of ideas and 
knowledge . His conclusions 'Jere that knowledge and ideas or iginate 
from sense experience, from. sensations of the particular... In 
good nominalistic trad ition , he declared innate ideas or f orms 
Here non-existen t .  This is empiricism--an emphasis on sense 
experience ,  a l imiting of knovrledge to sense experience , an emphasis 
on ideas as c '  e objects of Imowledge , and a disdain ing of any 
metaphys ical endeavor . Barkeley succintly stated te'e spirit of 
empiricism in lois Principles of Human Knowledge : 
No sooner do Ke depart from sense and ins tinc t 
to fol low • •  ., reason ., .. ..  but . ..  '" 'VJe. are 
insensibly dra',m into uncouth paradoxe s ,  
difficul ties , and inconsistances ,  vlhich 
mul tiply and gro» upon us as we advance in 
speculation ; till at leng t h ,  l'aving wan<i!ered , 
through many in tricate mazes ,  we f ind ourselves 
just wLe.re 'tile 't1ere , or Hj;ich is iY'orse , sit dovffi 
in forlorn scepticism", 
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essential role in forming earl ier empiricistnco For Locke accepted 
Descar e. s ' s  separation of tl:e kno'He.r and the knovJIl, of subje.ct and 
objecto He accep l-ed Descar __ es t s  theory of t 'P,e idea a s  the bridge 
bet1,Jeen t�-e kno\ver Flnd t be kno'hm.. And he related the idea to his 
nominal istic emphasis on sense experience by s aying tLat sensa tions 
give rise to a 11 ideas 0 All uc ever knO'H is our ideas . 
Actually, if one s trips this Lockian combina t ion of 
Cartes ian ism and n ominalism of tYe concept of substance , --e l --ns 
the essen t ial cbre of Hume t s  thought, the origin of later 
emp iric ism. lIume, as Loclr'" and Berkeley, fel t t',a t one should firs L 
s tudy 'd e powers and na I'ure of U'e mind in order to see the pos,' ible 
realm of human lmmvledge . As his predecessors , Hume a : sumed that 
all knovJledge comes from sense experience ; therefore , any talk of 
inna ; e ideas or metaphysical asser tions was foolish speculation. 
?!:!en s l:ould only claim knoVlledge of "hat Hey can lmou. 111.m1e , 
accopting the modified tOrTIl o f  Carte�: iani�m, said that men knoH only 
impre ' s ions and ideas .  T�-e difference. between these 1.:'\"10 "perceptions 
of mincpt is t l '{; strength of tl e.ir impact upon us . Impre S s ion s  
are direct and s tron g ;  ideas are "I;yeal,: and faint. Thus , impres sions 
are our more l ively pe.rception s ,  'uhile ide.as are t>;e less l ively 
parts of Qur e::cpe.rience .. 
110',,1 do t1·ese. ideas al�ise in our experience? ilum.e s Late;s in 
his lm Inquiry Concerning t l  e Ru.ma..'1 unders tandin g :  HThis creative 
power of the mind amount to n o lU(:re than . .. ..  compotmGD'"1gf trans_ 
posing, augmenting or d imin is;- in;;; t' e materials afforded to uS 
the senSe':; and_ experience .. H Idera,:9' are. mare copies of L�pre3 8 ions ; 
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tLerefore to find out e valid i ty of fln idea, \18 must look for tlle 
impres sion from 'tv-hieh i t  origina ted. Fur ther,. Hume concludes that 
each impress ion is dis tinct, tmrelated to t:�e impre s s ion or t: e 
idea >71 , ic preceeds or follows i t .  Ratl1er, :::::. associa te ideas to­
gether. 
S ince vie associate idea s ,  our "ideas" of contingency or neces s ary 
in V e  outer world are fallacious . For ,vila t impres s ion is t h;  
source o f  "chis i.dea. ;.  N o  such impres s ion exi s ts . Ra.ther, this 
idea is a generalization which is based upon other idea s .  Since 
impress ions or sense experience can be t',e only source of valid 
ideas, tl is idea of causality and neces 1Sity canno t  be accepted. 
The material ,,,orl d ,  God, ti,e self--all these fall into t he same 
category. They are all abstractions from ideas and thus cannot 
be related to any par ticular impres s ion. And a s  vIe :" 'ave seen, 
nominal ism only al101vs kno,,,ledge to come from Sense experience. 
Therefore, causal i ty, God, self, world are all metaphysical 
specuaation and beyond human knowledge . 
This brief summary of part of Hume ' s  tJ'oug b t  s ' ould represent 
He spirit and approach of empiricism. Therefore, in closing, let 
us sl..lll1ITl.arize once more the. origins of empiricism and each sources t 
specific contr ibution .. First, tilers is nominalism '\-7ith its assertion 
that all men knov1 are particulars and tl"at the:b:: par ticulars are 
only knoiim through sense. experience . Secondly, there is tLe 
pyscilological approach of Locke--V1e must first f ind out "'hat the 
mind can 1Olovl and now it does know this. His conclusions ;;\1ere in 
the tradi t ion of Jlominal ism : th� mind is limit�ed to kno\ving 
particulars and i t  knO"lS these particulars only t "rough sense 
experience . The resul t of is approach was that a propos i tion 
i s  only true if it can be rel ated to a particular sense experience 
(the t,,,en tie cl' century principle of verifibil i ty found in logical 
positivism) . 
The third and last s ource of empiricism is Cartes ianism. 
Descarte s 's thongl' t gave tvJO contribution s :  one was tbe tbeory t l !a.t 
tve can only knmv ideas ,  never the Horld around us ; secondly that 
tLe particulars found in impress ions and sense experience are 
entirely separRte from universals .  Thus , the empiricists concluded 
tf:at because. lJe can know only particulars of sense experience, 'tve 
can never knotv universal s .  These three sources merged into ti'e 
empiricism of Kume. l�en can knot; only tl eir OHU ide as ,  never 
reality in itself . Nan ' s  ImoHledge is l imited to sense-experience ; 
therefore , only if any idea ha:;, a referen t in sense experience " 
can i t  be accepted a s  valid knowledge . All 0 her ideas are 
abs truce metaphys ics .  
Criticism of t h is trad i t ion s' al1 be f o l l owing t e  analysis 
of logical pos i t ivism later in t ' e paper . However ,  t'ilO points 
need to be made i�ere. One is t: :nt t>e empiricism is the, result 
of Descartes'g attempt �,'O recon c ile a conf l ic t  bett'leen science. and 
a mecLanistic materialism. The. empirici s ts took the nominal is t 
emphasis on t; e par 'cicular of sense experience and cri ticized 
Car tes ianism in ligl1 of i t .  The result tvas a philosophy, tvl: ich, 
while including s c ience t.5 empLasiS' on t" e par"c:ic:ular and upon 
sense e.J;..-pe.rience, actually ended by undercutting science i tself. 
This si ua tion be('omes ever more cOlnplex w":'en t>e later 
empiricists at temp l to build their empirical sys tem on s c ience .. 
This complexity arises from e fact tbat empiricism is based 
partially on Cartes ianislll; Cartesianism is in turn based upon a 
conflic of and ontology 
materitll ism) . Bmpiricismts cr itic ism of innate ideas lU1dercut 
�the basis of science in Cartes ian ism; toorefore., as H'l1Jl1e. declared, 
causal i ty Dr the. material �uorld, e s sen -;�'_ial e.lements of the. philosophy 
of science , have no basis in empiricism. The result is that a deep 
antagonism exis ts oo t>:een emp iric ism and science. 
In the force of llume ' s  sceptical empiricism, one has three 
alternatives ,  if he l<;an ts to construct a meaningful philosophy., 
One is to accept Cartes ian ism and empiricism. Another is to accept 
Cartes ianism and attempt to re-work it into an acceptable philosophy 
in light of empiricism's criticisms . The third al ternative is t o  
reject Cartes ian ism and empiricism and -:�o re-analyze the d ilenm:rs 
that Galileo pre.sen ted to De8car �;:e : .  The first approach is represen ted 
by logical positivism and the l inquis tical onalyl ists . The second 
approach "'ill be �n approach reprecented by Ywnt. The third 
approach is based on Aristotl ianism, \'lith a rejec "I:ion of one hot1J. 
of Galileo's dilernma--mechan istic materialism. Let us f irst 
cons ider too second approach--that of Kant and the idealists. 
Immanuel Kant 
After having read Hume, Kan t 't'J(itS faced "lith a dilennna : on 
one hand he 1Jished to affirm mathe11lD.tics and science as d id his 
rational istic predece ssor s ; on tLe. 0 tl'cr hand, he was a\1a.re "tbat 
empir ical criticism in J:luw.e ' s  thoug1-,t undercut the validity of 
science , mathematics , and rationality a r: a V1hole. All 'tv-e Imo't-7 
according to H't.lD",..B 2re a series of discre 1""e sensations and idea.s. 
De.scar �;�e s t 8  approach vlas accepte.d b-1 Kant :  vIe Imo\1 ideas , 
not the 'tvarld of matter in itself .  1io'Hever, he reje.cted Locke ' s  
in terpretation of mind as a Hblank tablettt upon \'7 1 :ic'  experience. 
create;:; ideas, which e i t Ler do or do not correspond to tLe nrealH 
Norld out there. To Kant, the mind is active., not passive . The 
mind has certain forms upon which it organ izes experience. 'rhus , 
the mind is s tructural ;  and it approaches the experience it per­
ceives:�:-in terms of this s truc ture . Let us examine this structurett 
All knowledge starts with experience Klmt claims as did the 
nominal ists. However, the mind con tains "pure forms of sens ibility" 
by V7hich it orders sensation. These forms are space and tirae, 
which a.re in tuitiw and a. prior--that i s ,  t1�ese forms exist in ti;e 
mind before vle have an experience. Thus, Kant agreed 1>lith llUme 
that we experience discrete, unrelated sen: ations .  But our mind 
has these forms of :;pace and time to order sensations . TIme , 
space and time are un iver sal and necess ary wi thin human experience. 
Let us take a specif.ic example. 
This table unon whic1' I am ,·n: i ting presents a discrete 
sensation as i t  impinge s upon me. l1y mind relates this sensat ion 
to the sensation of the f loor and put': tLe table on the floor. }fy 
mind relates t 'e sensation of the »all to tha i · of t' ·e floor and 
the table , placing t)'e ,,,all behL'1d U e  table a t  tLe edge of the 
floor. Now t!·en ,  each ind ividual wl0 looked in to t ! · i s  room would 
see s table on t· e floor v7i t' a Hall be! ind it. Each mind »ould 
order these sensa tions in terms of s pace ; therefore , a universality 
't-lould exist among individaul expe.riences of this room. The same 
approach applies to time as \'lel l .  
Thus , Kan t declare s our m ind orders experience in terms of 
space and thue.. Fur tl-'e.r, Kan t  aC- f'erts - - tbere are categories of 
'- ' - 8  nOt-! orde.red experience. 
it receives. Tl-'ese. two c [l. i cgories are. substance and causal i ty. 
The mind ll"1part.8 a tft11 ing in i ts e l f ;  11 u::icl' underlies the sensations 
it receive s .  To ful ly grasp -Lhis poin t ,  ,\1e must remember tI�at 
Kant accepted 'e Car : es ian radition tha i to lenoH is to lenow 
conten ts of our mind . Berkeley demon s trated that no basis exists 
upon "{,,hieh to asse.rt a material Horld ; for all i>7e experience are 
our o"mp.dea s .  Kant meets this diff iculty by a s ser ting that the 
mind a priori (before e,:perience) gives to its sensations a material 
substance . Thus , cael'  mind unders Lands each sensation 'ti ich has 
been ordered in terms of spare and order by tl'e category of 
substance. 
Also the mind tmderstands all of its" experie.nce in terms of 
causal ity. I t  unders tands e.xperience in :.e.rms of c ause. and effect. 
Altboug': causa l i ty as subs tance cannot be established from 
sensations, t-�-e mind use.s t::ese categories as it USB " t:,;e forms of 
sen s ibility. Thus, Earl t feels that the mind make s its 0wn "orld 
and that a tm iversality exis t,· in t;�e vlay ind ividual mind s make 
the ir 'iYorlds .  Tl"is un iversal ity i s  en :�ured by tl',e tttranscenden tal 
aperception" ",hich is common to all minds and which departs to 
these minds a common s truc ture . 
In analyz ing Kan t ' s  thought, one must conclude that he 
succeeded in his eff:or t. The innate ideas \,Jere ti e Source of 
rationality ,  order , and miversal i i-Y in t oe Car te s ian system. 
As i:: e idea "  of Plato gave reality to the �lOrld of experience, 
to knowledge, and to value s." the innate ideas ,  whic1,j reason in­
tui tively grasped as true,. were tbe. foundation from which all other 
aspec t8 of Car e s ianism 'Here deduced. llhen Bri tis:' nominalism 
d i screl] ited the inna e idea s ,.  but 
it i>1as only a matter of t:iIne 1ID. til sor::eone demonstra t:cd the 
re.duced e.xper ience to unrela 'rJ�d sensations and as he den ied 
causality, sub/3 tance and much more. o 
Kant d id es:tablish order once more 'Hitl1in tl'-e Cartes ian frame-
Hork. But he sacrif iced much to F'lee t empirical c r i t icism", To be 
sure t here is a im iver sality in >mlU2n experie.nce in te.rms of 
experience ' s  s tructure. N o  longe.r is <?:xperience a d i sordered 
C h .l0tic mass of sensations as Hum.e. s tated. Kan :-_ d id s olve t h is 
problem by asserting tLa<- a l t hough sPace, substance , and 
causa l ity ' c-annot be de:mon s i:ratcd from sensa tions, e.very mind orders 
se.nsat ion in te.rms of these forms and categorie. ::c . HOlilcrVer ,  i.11 s o  
re-establishinrr; order in exper ience. and lena'Fledge , Hhi c : 3  in 
Car :"cs ianism ·re.sted upon the no':;'] repud intcd innate ide a;:;:; ,  I{,;m t 
sacr i f i ced objec'> ivity en tirely. For Kan t: admits U , n  TJC C[Ulnot 
ascertain \,ir,e L1�er space, L itle. , subs tance , and caus a l i ty do exist 
beyond Q1JI' mL"1d . T,le mus t  therefore, po s it [;tIC ;" a 'Horld l'];:.ich 
t1:.e forms :' and cate.c:orie:; imply becau88 or fb'AC�h'e '11 cou12erns . T>us , 
v71'ile knovJledge i s  uni'versal and ordered i t  is co subje.ctive--
that i s ,  knovrlerlf:te. reflec.ts the s truc turinr: of mind, n o t  'i:he 
s �,Tucture of: a!1 obje.c ivr� rea l i ty beyond m ind .. 
:t�ntianisro. represents a plausible re;;)orking of Cartes iHuism 
in l ig > t  of Lhe cri ticisms of Br i t i s t  empiricism. If one accepts 
t1�e. on tolor;y tha Gal ileo presented 0 Descar ':;e , Kantianisrn. repre.sents 
a pos i t ion in tvhi.c!' s c ience. s 1.1 1 has Bean ing . HO;1£v'Br, if one 
in Kant ian isHl tLat ' e. does not knO'\v as objective ':-Torld .. Por after 
al l ' if one aSSlIDles an objec :: ive Vlorld i"lhic; is entirely al ien 
to thought and r a 'i'ionality ,  he has n o  rig 1 , t  to complain that he 
cannot leno"'>] tl' i s  'l;}orld 1<rith thoughts based on rational cons tructs 
such as space ,. t ime , or causality. For thoughts based on rational 
cons true ' s  can represen t only that ""hie h Lllc ludes ra tionality and 
thoug h t  a s  an e ssen tial component of itsel f .  But t' , is point s hall 
be further expl icated later. 
UTi'e Whole is tile Real"--Absolute Idealism 
Philosophy folloVling Kant took tHO roads, each almost d irec tly 
opDosed to t':e other . Idealism floris hed , al though Kant bad 
declared tp.�'lt me.taphys ics 'ivas an area in vlhich no ImoHledge CQuld 
be gained. Hegel and his succe ssor s buil t great. metaphys ical sys tems 
based on the. concept of an absolute mind HhicL creates and 
s tructures the 'Horld around us , a "  Kan t ' s  human mind creates and 
s truc tures its o;m ;;orld. The concept of absolute mind perbaps 
gre1;'l d irectly out of the trtranscendental aperception'" \vhich 
Kan t asserted gave tmiversali'l'Y in Imo'\'ling. For each Hind partook 
of tl is transcendental aperccp tion and thus f a ined the s tructures 
by Vlhich it ordered its experience. 
Yet ,  a deeper connection exist s  be tween the. ideal i s t s  end 
Yum t. Kan t had identified t e knower and tJ:e known. He bad 
un ited the object and t e subjec t by making ti e object entirely 
subjective . Alt]'ough for t ' ,e most part, the absolute idealists 
believed in an objec t ive Horld , it "as a "/orld based upon mind, 
dependent upon mind , and mean ingles s Hithout mind.. The \vorld of 
stands in ab' ol ute idealism about on ' e  same level £is Plato.. It 
is a secondary rea l i ty ;  for i t  is fragmented and par t ia l .  Hind , on 
the ot11er han"!> can grasp t he "hole of things ; it ean relate each 
to everything else. Therefore , mind is of greater reality t 1'an 
matter ; for the more universal is t l�e more real . 
Thus , idealism 'tvi t h  i ',8 empl-a r: is upon the whole. as the real 
ignored sense experience. In t he spirit of the seventeenth 
century rationalis ts f o l l oHing Deccartes , logical necess ity 
determine's reality and reason can grasp sucl logical necessity and 
ti us lmovl t he tqhole. However, because sense experience deals 
only ,7ith t1 e particulars ,  fragments of tile "" ole, it is not an 
importan t medium of knoHledge . 
!loFever , t e 8C' 001 of absolute idealism is on ti e w ain today. 
The philosophy of Hege l , Bradley, and Royce is n o t  in vogue today. 
Rat" er, the ot' er road that philosophy fol101ved af ter Kant is today 
t1 e mos t  traveled--the road of pos i t ivism. 
Logical Pos i t ivism 
To describe the origins of t' is movement in contemporary pl ilosophy 
is not easy to d o .  Cert$linly one '-'ouree i s  t l  e pOS i t ivism of 
Comteo Sc ie.nce , Comte asserted , is tYe f inal stage in man ' s  
in tal lectual deve l opment ;  rel ig ion ,qas t l  e. f ir s t  s tage , Hhilc 
p �'ilosop l',y 'Has > e second . HO:;';0ver , nOVi sc ience should en tirely 
replace philosop' y and rel igion in \'7estern c iviliz2 tion .. ' Science 
is no'>! t '  e 
philosophy and re.l ig ion can present is on ly opinion , '\<rhile science 
.' 
can gi'\re facts .. I I  
A second source of t h i s  movement is Kan t t s  concerninr� 
the limits of hums:n i:-..nowledge --that i s ,  t.hai.:- tie (:2,11 'have no Imo·;.y-
ledge of metaphys ical issue s .  A metaphysical iss1..'<3 ,  so the 
positivists 11sre to say, W"£1 ( Oflf! which had no referent in sense 
experience. Benea t h  this assumption l ie ,'  t he nomina l i s t  assUTIlption 
that all kno,;ledge is derived from sense experience. l!'etaphysics 
debates issues such as ontology or God ,  H1:ic1: are beyond sense 
experience and thlts human knoHledge. Therefore , metaphysics is 
meaningless and men should not involve tl!emselves with these issues 
that can never be settled. S ince sc ience deals with only sense 
experience (Ol ! What a fallacy this is )� it is the only acceptable 
vehicle of knOlilledge. Thus , the logical positivists combine Gomte ' s  
positivism "ith British nominalistic emp iricism. Added to this 
pos ition is Kan t ' s  censure of mataphysical endeavor. 
T" e ,corners tone of modern logical positivism as found in A. J. 
Ayer t s  Language , Truth and Lsgic is the principle of verifibility. 
To be meaningful a propo s i  t,ion mus t have a referen t in sense 
experience that can be aff irmed or denied. If sud: a referent 
cannot be pointed out, the proposition is mean ingles s .  Thus, the 
logical pos itivists hope to exclude �propo§ ition s ;suct; at'! God or 
values from hUTIlan cons idera ion to avoid endles s ,  sen , eless 
con Lroversy. As Ayer s tates in Language? TrutL and Logic 
a l l  propositions wich have factual content 
are empir ical hypottes is • • • • and this 
means t ' , a t  every empir ical hypothesis must be 
relevant to some actual , or posp,ible., e.};."})erience. 
so tha a s tatement ,qhich is not relevant ' to 
any experience is not an empirical hypothesis , 
and ac tual ly has no factual content", 
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HOlvever t  the f: a l 1 2cy o f  l o g ical pos i t ivism a s  developed at 
Vienna by Rudolph Carnap and t" en in England by o t '  erB including 
Bertrand Russell is: tLis : no empirical referent exists for the 
principle o f  verifibility.. T;':erefore, s ince each proposi ion 
must l 'ave. a referen t in sense experience, the proposition Vlhich 
asserts th�s to be true is itself a meaningle$$ proposition . 
The principle of verif ibil i ty doe, not : ' ave an empirical referen t ,  
'lhich it demands o f  a l l  mean ingful propos i tions. And to !:ave a 
meaningl e s s  propo s i t ion as the criterion of meaning is an abused 
position. 
Hovrever ,  this fallacy in logical positivism is a matural 
result of t ' le empirical tradi tion i t  has in herited. lIume clearly 
demons trated that Hitl:out me : aphysics� sense experience if a c haotic , 
d i sordered Hor ld. Af ' er he innate ideas Here repudiated, 
Cartecianism f e l l  apart. Kan t only reordered it by making 
tnetaphysic21 a sser t ions about tl'e s truc ture of t e mind ; ! 'Ov7eVer, 
he f e l t  these a priori asser tions of the forms and categories 
could be al loV7e d .  
T i l e  logical positivists missed tilis crucial point t' a t  
empiricism t o  be meaningful involves metap ' -y s ic s ,  tf.':at any position 
involves metap! ysica t o  ba mean ingful . Tl,ey f e l t  that a posLion 
t at refers only to sense experience is devoid of assllmpl ions "'hich 
go beyond sensory experience -'9 lImvever ,  their ptinciple of 
ver ifibility is a metaphysical asser tion. No, if t; e positivists 
"ran t to avoid ti,e chaotic , mean ingless Vlorld of ltume (vJhich ac tually 
discred i t s  s c ience ) ,  they are involved in metap' ysics. As Kan t 
Sayl and did , t h:� posi tivis Ls too mus t and do make metaphysical 
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as '�er ions to avoid Hll:m2: t s scep t ic: ile. �d ' ey rut 1;les s ly 
apply empirical sceptic ism to religion, value s ,  and philosophy, 
t hey ' old back from doing 80 to sc ience and to t heir own pos i t ion. 
The T hird AHerna tive--Rea l ism 
The pas i t ion cf modern philosophy to mos t people is s omevlha t 
absurd . A philosopby w'hich d i squalifies l arger area s  o f  'uman 
experience--religion, art ,  etc. --from meaningful d i s cu s s ion by a 
principle V7bich even undercuts the philosophy as \vcll--this makes 
little sense. Ye t, to claim t l'at t he s tructures o f  knotJledge 
such ac, time, space , causality are only devices o f  mind to order 
exper ience and may not exist in t i  e object ive "orld_ this also 
makes l it tle sen s e .  Yet ,  this is t.l�:e d ilemma He face t if WB acce.pt 
t he Cartesian framework. Either ,ye end in absurd s ce p t icism ( t hat 
is if "'" carry the empirical crit icisms to their logical result 
alternative does exis t ;  for if '';<;'1:! re-analyze. De;]carte s ' s  starting 
po in t ,  He can f ind a ne" poss ibility. 
Descartes accepted an ontology from Gal ileo of me.chan is tic 
materiRl i sm. He al so acce pted the epis teraology of s c ience. 1.\'" 
seen in the \>Jork of Hobbes and in t ,e re.sul t of empirical criticism. 
y.,\0"'" 
n o  place e.xist,· in suel an on toloE�yfJ� sc ieTIr:e t s  e p i �;temologYl1 �aS 
reference to mind , n o t  ; '0 boc1 ie '; in mot ion o no"\-!ever , through 
our s tudy o f  Plato and Aris tot-lc , '>;e have. seen that epis temology 
and ontology are te rela i-ed. Each out of t ha other . 
A eel" a m  on tology impl iCQ a cer <, ain epis temology.. A cer t.ain 
epistemology implies a defin i ) e.  on '; ologyo These t\vO of H 
philosophy must be harmon ious, if tl:e philosophy is to be valid€ 
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an epis te.mol ogy implie : a cer tain ontology" If Imo1>71edge. is of 
the unc hanging, ue mus t  kno'Vl that 'Vlhich doe s  not cr�ge.o Thus , the 
forms \,78. knOH must ave a r:er tei n ontological statu89 a certain 
being, if Plato ' s  epis temology is to staTld .  Al though Plato relates 
his ep is temology to an ontol ogy which support s i t ,  he fails t o  
satis;Ey the e:ooverse--an ep i s temol ogy "hie h s upport s th e ontology. 
For in tl;e Parmen ides Plato demon strated the ambiguous relation; hip 
of form to the particular m. d tila t bec ause form and particular 
are unrelate d ,  forl!lS are unlmm,abl e .  Further , Ar isto tle s olved 
t he epistemological d iff ic ul ty by a c 1 ;ange in ontology--the 
concrete f orm, the universal in tie parti cu lar . 
Thus, a cl ose relationship exists bet1"een epis temol ogy 
and onto l ogy. The d i lemma facing modern P',i1osophy results directly 
from the fac t that Galileo anq Descar tes a ttemp ted to combine 
in to a philosophy an epis te.mology and an ontology "hich did not 
grovJ out of eac' 0 1:1:er , but ratJler " ere in d irect c.o nf l ict with 
edcl' ot" e.r" Of course, Descartes had to pose a dualism, for 
t he epistemol ogy of s c ience and thc onit010gy of He c hanistic 
materialism refer to tiliO entirely d ifferent world <e .  Of colU:" s e ,  
empiricism ripped Cartes ian ism a < under ; for Descarte s ' s  ontology 
ond epistemology are in d irect co nf l ic t . let alone n o t  supporting 
eac h ot her <> 
Let u s ,  hOl¥ever , a t tempt to d iscover "'hat ontol ogy the 
epistemology of s cience implie . To do t ' i8 He f irs t  mus t ex­
pl icate science ' s  epistemology.. Descartes and modern phi losophy 
asser ted that kno1vledge begin in obje.etivi i:y co Knowledge begins 
53 
uith a neog ito ergo SUfrin from \1hich all tha rest of knoHledge. 
comes .. Before. becoming involve.d t,;e. mus j', fL'I1d objec t ive. ttevic1ence" 
for so doing. S c ience. in opposition to this approac,h asserts that 
knowledge begins Ll1 involvement .  To acquire l;nmvled g':l one mus t 
first experiment ",  He , mus t ,  in short become invo lved with his 
environment .  Alt] 'ough this approach is d ifferent in terms of 
experirrl.enta"tion, sciencet's approach to Ino'fl1edge gained from 
perception is t}':e approacb mOB everyone. as S't.D.11es .  
For e.xample : if one uant e  to Imov--1 if the w,q l:er on t t"e stove 
is not" boiling, l,e does not remain in his armc hair. Hondering ,"hat 
knov71edge 1:6 :�as of the tvater boil ing. Rather' he strides into the 
kitchen and over to tl e stove. ll1i? oococ,es involved in his environ-
ment e As he burns his mouth on the te.a he has just made ,  he 
bel ieves he is perce iving not ideas , but real objects , d istinct 
from him. As one lives day by day, a: l:e. eats his meal s ,  reads 
his paper , and brushes hi", teeth--'te believes he knO';8 objects 
in en'Vironment ,  not representa -::ions or idea s .  His experience 
in percep ::ion i s  one of cncoun ter G 11e encoun te.rs objects in his 
environment ,  becoming aware. of t hem as be does so. 
Thus , everyone of us assumes a re al ism in terms of 
perception as we l ive our day to day l ives� l;'Je are quite ce.rtain 
'He encowter and become aHare of our e.nvironment itse.lf, not a 
representation of it. This is realisro,...- tl'iat objects exist distinct 
from us , 'VJh ic h v7e. can directly Imo'H througI1 sense perception. 
If lJe haw no rea son to doubt this ;)o s i t ion 'V1!:iCj, tye accept in 
ord inary l ife , s hould tve doubt i t .  Descartes beCause of a 
substan tial dualism did doub i t ",  But a s  ':qe sLall :;;ee., s c ience 
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actually rejects this dualism", Fur t l  er , sc ience S!-ctually uses t·':e 
everyday approach to perception. 
Science views m.an as an involVed organism. Descartes a'rld 
pre.ceding philosophy vie'{ved man as objec t i\T2. mind . To t!te la t ter 
perception is Cl'tvarene s s  of ideas .  To the. former perce ption is an 
encomter of an org;mism \'lith its environn16nt. To the la tter 
perception is only passive. To tLe. former pe.rcep tion is active. 
lin organ ism to perceive its environment must be involved vlith i t ;  
i t  must act. As i t  acts,. the organism encounters and becomes 
a,,,are of its environment. Being aHare of , perceiving and 
enco'llltering one t s environment is 'i-he same. 
1m objection might be raised !,ere concerning the reality of 
the environment He perceive . This objec Lion could be in t,vo 
forms : one in terms of subjective ideal ism; the other in terms 
of nuclear phys ic s .  I£t us consider the 1a :ter first. Our 
environn-ent ,  nuclear physics tells us f is made up of moving atoms :} 
n o t  t1"e objects 't"Je perce ive such as trees ;;, car s "  or houses .  The 
t"bIe upon whici: I am writing is actually innumerable atom: , 
moving and s�lirl ing through space.. Th� \'Iorld of atoms--this is 
v7hat the 'Horld really is. Tnes'e parti cles compose our environment ;  
tl'erefore.s our environmen t is not as it seems. 
Both pictures of our environmen t--tilnt tv-h ie;' phys ics S !'Ol7S 
and tha t 'V7hich vJe. perceive ordinarily-�are. equally as valid. To 
state t" a t  our sensory organs are l imited to only one part of 
real ity is a val id aS0ertion .  To declare , hOW'l?Wr , that this part 
of reality vl>ich our senses perce.ive is not real because. o t l : e.r  
parts o f  reality e.xis '� Y71:icl" vJC cannot perce ive. Hiti'out s pecial 
ins trUll1en ts--3uch as asse.r ;·.ion is absurd. For knouledge of the 
otLe.r par ts of real ity--atoDS and sub-atomic Hor-Ids , sound Haves 
too 10v7 or high in fre.quency f or our ears , or e.lectromagnetic 
Haves 1Vith a frequency too hi;;;h or lo�7 for our eyes--all come 
from perception. Let u: not make tJ'e mistake t hat Galileo and 
LocJc.e made. Eit ' er every part of reality He perce ive is equally 
x 
". as real or all w) perceive can be tructed. 
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The second objection Hldch could be made tovlard this f orm of 
realism is that of subjec tive idealism. The subjec tive idealist 
1Vould point out tbat lie l ave no kno1Vledge of things unless ,)C are 
perceiving them. Therefor e ,  we have n o  evidence that they exist 
outside of our perception, and t hus have no right to claim H at they 
do. If I left this table and "�lent into anot"er room, this table 
v)oul d not exist, since no one Hculd perce ive i t .  In order t o  
exist, a thing mus t be perceived. 
The issue Lere is do we "ave evidence that does our environment 
and the objects ,�hich compose it- exist outside of our perception. 
Of course if no nne perceives the 1qas : � ing " on Monument in Washing-taD, 
D. C . ,  'tve cannot demons trate tl: a t  i t  continues to exist .  But to 
say tha t i t does not exist is absurd . Objects \Y"'e. perceive. seem 
to have a continuity of exis tence Hhic h " is not dependent upon our 
perce iving them.. ttll1en I return to the room in 'Vlhich the table. stands , 
I am quite cert 'ein tLat the tab12 hac exis ted tl:ere, al t hough no 
one perce ived it. Alt hough an argument can be devised against 
objects existing outs ide. of our pe.rception, t he Height of experience 
lies vli t h  the con tinuity of the exis tence of objects outs ide of 
our perceiving the.me 
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One last is sue must be. den I t  Hith before on t1;e vieu-
point of perception that t l 'c epis temology of science hold s .  This 
issue. is error in perception . If a man as 1'.e acts Hithin his e.nviron-
ll1ent encounters and perce i.ve s d irectly the oblieots ef his environ-
mant ,  hoYT could I-:e have a mis t.aken perception" Ho,:? can vIe have. an 
erroneous percep 1:i.on . if He percei.ve the object itself. For it 
would ap pear that if 1110. mal�e an error in our perception, 't1e have 
not reelly known tbe object a s  it is . Further, is this: 
mistaken perception? If it. 1'aG no object, 'wllicL it presen t s ,  
isn ' t  it s <J1Il.ething l i ke  an idea--$ome thing exis t ing only in ts .,  
These t,\170 objections mus t  be anm\!ered- if this form of realism 
developed 50 far is to stand. 
Actually, error only presents a ,problem to realism, if man t s  
perceiving i s  vie.wed as a total process . For if obje.ct s  impinge. 
on our mind, an error Ie ans tha 'VTB do not perce.ive t he object. 
This \'7ould refute realism. However ,  the form. of real ism Hhici this 
paper de"\''Blops pre.sents perc.eption as an ac : ive proces s .  Han mus t  
ooccrne L!1vol'V-ed v7ith hi,  environment before he can perce ive it. 
lIe mus t act to GnCOlJI1ter the obje.cts he perceives _ _  tl1Us ,. error c.sn 
bs ascribsd to h is lack of atten tivenes s  in his encounter "lith the 
object .  Ll realism iv>ere obje.cts impinge tl e ir l ikeness on man · s  
e::'cpe.r ienee , error uould indeed present a problem. For if one 
error s , obje.cts mus t not fsitf-,-fully impinge therr images upon 
man ' s  mind and t11uS man does n o t  knmv the object. Hotvever, 1-11 
re31ism iql'cn percep tion is an ac tive process ,  error can be 
a-;,:tributed to man I S  activity, not to his no t knO"hTing t he object. 
If a man is not Bufficiently atten tive in his enco'tD.l. ter Hith an 
object , l-,e yrill err in perception of it. 
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n tcnt ivc: in 
environmen t ,  e. uill nol err. Par percept ion is d ire.ct, irr!lned ia i:e.c 
It cons is ts of one. t :;:  be-corninG" ,anare oX: an object in l : is environment "  
I f  one is attentive., he can rightly perce.ive the object.. I f  per-
ce.ption is med i:a ind irect, then error tneallS Lhe object of OlK 
environment did not crea te a true ima2'e Dr idea of itse.lf in us . 
If so ,. then hOl,; C8,n ·VIe say 'VlB perce. ive. tLe objec t .  But HdirectH 
realism does not 'ave t h i s  problem. 
In sillrunury ,. t l 'e.n , science. holds a vie.v7point 0f percep tion "\vhich 
i s  tt'e COIJ1tr:on ord inary approacL to perception.. To perce iv-c 1>7(; must 
pc involved lvit' out environment "  �'7e. mus t  act and e.ncoun i'er it .. 
Upon encolm terinl1 i1� ,  \"re bec ome @.l,zare of it . "\1e are immediately, 
directly B'Nare of i t .  He do n 0 t  perce ive. it U:roug:;-; ideas or 
sense-datum. 'liTe perce ive tLe objec t s  themselve. s .  Also 'VJa 1 ave. 
OOglID to see t l �e on -;;ology, V;A::' :-he.ory or reaity, t}'�at s c ience ' s  
epis temology implies .. Our environment i s  objectively real ; i t  
exists 1:P:;yond our percept ion of it. It [ las Hbe. i.'t1gtt , VJ(;ieh is not 
con z: ingent upon our kno'tving i t .  T;11.S theory of being is Hdirect 
re.alism .. U Let 118 tUl"TI to the second half of s c ienc e ' s  epis temology-­
mders -" nndinr':--to See in more de.tail Hhat t his direct real ism i s .  
Experimentat ion , 1 - oH8ver , is only one p a r t  o f  sciance t s  
theory o f  kno>;;'Jinr;.. l'iot only must He expcrin1ent ,-viti our environmen t , 
but tva nnalyze our :E indinr;s -[",0 f ind the underlying prin c iples involved.:> 
Let us tDl� a specific example. SUPPo,c·e a c hemist lJants to un der­
s t211.d t h�  re.act ion of ele.mental sulp' ur 'Ni th permanganf':lte ion in 
a.cidic solution. T ; ,e f irs t  thing; he '10uld d o  is to prepa.re sn 
acidic solut ion and tben put e lemental sulphur and pe.rman�anate. 
into t1--e solution.. Af i-er h2.ating gen tly'I sUPf'o;;.;e the chemist 
farther L-:; of the. 2{) lution, he found thU'l t e mnnf�211ouS ion 
pas pre.sent in solut ion., 
After f ind out the.se. thinGs , t ; ,8. c1 emis vould tllen attempt 
It is avid-en t the permangr.ma te 
ion oxidize.d sulphur to sulfate md in 80 Has reduced to the. 
lnf1uganous ion ", Tlms, the. c hernist is brought to oxid 0. tion-re.duction 
reactions and 'l;'7i t11 barilill1 sulfa te to 801ubil ityo If h� understands 
solution, Hhich containoo eleme.ntnl sulphur and pe.rmangan a te ion .. 
Thus , only TJ" en the s c ien t i s t  unde.rs t an d s  t he  prin ciples involved 
in that 'Hhicj" he is ::" tudyinf0; does s c ience c l a im it ftlmowsrt about 
the situation . Under s t-a nding is objective, as opposed ,to 
perception Vlhich is involvement wi t h  one t s  environmen t .  As to the 
process of understandin g ,  I leave this again to pyschology. But 
I vl0uld l ike 'i o make tHO poin t s .  One i s  t l,at th is unders tm d in g  
takes place in tie ne.uro-pat htvays in our ce.re.br t.Ofl ..  Secondly 'I 
the. e1 e;.;trical impulses that move along these ne.uro-pat h'\vays are 
t he t :ought "tvC ; ave. . We do not tmderstand in a subst9nce c n lled 
mind , 'tvhich is non- phys ic21 in nature. l'lind a t  most can be only 
an ab�:; trac i;ion , describing too process of thinking .. Ho"'w these 
electrical impul ses in our cerebr U.'f'fi produce t :  e t l�oughts \-,70; 
experience i s  lmlmmlffi. Yet ,  has a ical s tructure a�d 
i s  a physical proce s s .  
The. point o f  importance. t o  this paper is ] �or,,7 c a n  our t houghts 
tmders tand our environment . Hov? can our reasoning Imo\<r the 
principles 11l : i c  'He and our environnen t operate. Ll. lmdarstand ing 
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sc ience develops rational constructs based upon f in 
exper imen tation.. TJ'B-se rational cons tructs such as oxidation-
reduction or evolut ion ;;1"e genuine explanations o f  hOH reality does 
",ork, Ho", is this possible? The only answer is that reality is 
itself rat ional , t " at real i.ty i s  constructed in terms of rat ionality, 
which man in his radonal thought can under s tll ft d ,  I f  real ity is 
a l ien to rationality, such as if it is a mec :'":anistic nR terial ism, 
�'v' 
then rational i ty could pertairi'{to man ' s  un:1 ers tanding , not to reality. 
Only if ra donality is an e ?sential part of real ity, can the 
rationality sc ience uses " 0  unders tand reality actually per t a in to 
realit'y, 
Then , what ontology or t l'eory of reality does s cienc e ' s  
epistemology imply? \'le have seen in i t s  approach to perception 
that s c ience impl ies an objective ,  d irect realismll Furt her , 
science in i t s  approach to understanding implies an objective 
real ism in v-7ilich ra-1·ionality is an essential part� Thus , reality 
is composed of physical s tructures to be s ure ,  but to. e  physical 
s tructures are no t of the nature of Galileo ' s  ttbodies in mot ion $ H  
Rather rational i ty is an e «sential c oo s tituent of tl ese s tructures 
and for the. processes in nature whiCh they produce.. I t  is hard 
to e ' cape our eondi tioning on this poin t ; f o r  He vie" real ity as 
inert , material substances devoid of any qualitites t ha t  we attribute 
to t hought .. 
To facill itate an unders tanding of t i'e ontology "7hieh s c ience ' s  
epistemology implies , I have avoided us ing the terms mind and matter, 
Mind implies a par t of real i ty '''hie h is not related to a phys ical 
s truc ture $ Matter implies s truc ures or obje c t s  wl' ich can never 
be related to thought. The ontology s c ience implies is one in "hich 
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all things arc rel£ded L11 P" "' " ,Cr" 8 true tures or obje.c ts , bu; one 
in V]'hicb these same s truc ture s are relate.d to thougLt and ra tionality. 
Phys ical S "_Tuc tures produce thoug),t. T hought can underst-and 
the physical s tructures tvh ich produced i t ..  Eva I utian has produced 
an organism whicL can think and lIDders tand evolution .  lil110 Can deny 
that t' ought and rationality are not related to the physical s truc tures 
of our environment .  Both of t e ee are in tertlVined, inter-dcpendent , 
inter-related. Tl'e nature of thought is sue!, that it is related 
to p hysical s truc ture s .  Tlle nature o f  tI,e physical struc tures of 
our environrnent is such t o , a t  i �  can produce tl1oug l: t  and be 
ordered and patterned on t e  basis o f  rationality and thought. 
T h is ontology that t e epis : emology of s c ience imp l ies is 
quite c lose to Jlristotl ianiSWj "ith the f orm in the particular, 
ordering and s truc turing poten tial ity. In Aris hotl ianism t " ought 
is an essential componen t of reality. vie c an lIDderstf/llu particulars 
because they have. been s tructured by t houe1;t or form.. Aristotl ianism 
a l s o  asserts tha'l all He Can knoVJ are particulars ; but in the study 
of particulars 'He. can go beyond tLe particular .. The scien tist 
studies the partim lars to f ind principlec beyond the particular 
by tvh icI' he can tmders tand the. puticular Q In short, one carrie.s 
out the impl ica t ions or his finding? to their logical ro ncius ion. 
So in tbis s c ientific 8pirit� le t liS carry our conclusions in 
this paper to t1 e.ir logical resul 'j·,o) T;;e, first step is to de c ide 
1;vhether s c ience. t s  epis temol ogy does lead one to kno\>] real ity .. 
.. lmyone i;,;rJ-io t 1-:inks of t :" e produc ts of scien tific researc from 
airplanes to cars to druE�s Can ,ave I i '; tIe doubt that s c ience does 
�iJorkt> Science. does apDear -to tmde.rs tand the Hay reality is composed 
and tI:e. uay it fun c .  ions " If tf'e.n science t s  epistemology does le.ad 
. " .  l.mp.tl.e.s 
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mus t be the correct theo�.1 of reality. �:;inee s cience f s epis temology 
involws rational ity and the. perceiving of pl"ysical s tructure s ,  
t1;en real i',y must be pbysical s tructures composed on tl:e basis cf 
rat.ional ity or t " 'ouf:;l\t . In short, science t s  epistemology is an 
objective , rational realism" If one part of a philosophy is 
val id, S o  must be its logical oo nsequent. As 'He l:J:lvc seen, an 
epis temology or on i"ology a l\1ays implies a s peci-cic ontology or 
epis temology. 
Tl':us, because sc ience t s  epis temology understands rea. ity 
:in terms of rational constructs and theories , science impl ie.s that 
reali':,-Y is rational ,  that t l -oug i : t  plays an essential part in 
re.al ity. From this conclus ion t,'70 results can be drctim . rrLe 
first is that the T70rld tha " t he �lUm.a.nities implies is the same. 
as that "'h ich science L11lpl ie s .  Art, l iterature. mus ic , religion--
all these deal Hith tJ'oug" , t ;  and science implies tl'at bought is an. 
es sen tial component of real ity--it is the "form" of p hys ical structures. 
T:'lUS , far from. discrediting the 1;vorld of humanities, science 
declares real ity to be dynamic, not static, to be r a- t l;1 ftIA 
not invariable, to have produced t hought and to be structured by 
thOugJlt ,  not to be alien to thought. In s hort" science provides 
a p i : ilosopi;ical founda ion for the huru$l1i ties. 
'l'be second result of science t s  ontology deals \lith h00v realivl 
is s truc ture.d by tboug>t and thus contains thought. Science implies 
"Ie unders tand real ity and t i e  Hay that reality is structured. 
This could only be , if "thoUf�1 t preceded the. s tructuring 
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of: reality and s tructured rea! ity in te.rm o f  t.he rational 
constructs of t l)Jur;ht. Or to put it :in another Hay, if the 
process of cosmic evolutiOn is So s tructured to have produced thouglt 
which can understand this evolution, thought mus t  " ave preceded 
this evolution and s tructured i t . Thfu t 'ougl:t before re::: l i ty 
is God.. Thus, the. \q�rkability of science. implies God . Because of 
t he real ity science implies by its being able to understand reality, 
this rea lity in turn imp l ie s  pure thought--God . To be sure ot;  er 
arguments can be .  developed !'o explain ·.he emergence of thougl:t 
in real ity by evolution and the s tructuring of real ity in terms of 
thought. But t (:e proponc1erence of evidence for this argument 
malce s suc'rj other rat'; er t h in. 
Then in closing , my argument hare 'tv-it ;; the pos itivist or t i s  
K&n�:ian i s  not over 'the is sues o r  \vilat 'tve lQ1o\v, but rather over 
tl1e i ssue of 'i'lhat th?!. nature of Hhat \'13 knOH i s ",  I ,  too, assert 
our lQ10tvledge is of p,:::rticulars found in perception. But these 
par ticulars are such it"1. UR Lure. that He can knOi>7 tbat 'tv;";,ich is 
be.yond t!-,em" Tl ey are 00 ncrete i.11 their ttp>,ysicality, a but 
miversal in terms of th e  thoug1-;t '>lhich s tructures them. T:'ey nre t 
indeed , concrete un i'\�rsal s .  For tvha';', a pnrticula.r consis s o f  is 
both its physical qU2J1tity and the thoug:>t construct upon Vi'hie )) 
it is s tructure.di! The. one g ives a particul rx concretenes s ;  the 
chthe:r (; lVe.S it universality., 
Ai'ten , Henry D . ,  
The Nev7 .¢.merican 
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